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 Despatches from the Front: Recent
 Skirmishes Along the Frontiers of Electronic
 Contracting Law
 By Jane Kaufman Winn and Michael Rhoades Pullen*
 INTRODUCTION
 In 1999, the volume of business conducted over the Internet and other
 computer networks continued to accelerate rapidly, while the volume of
 hype associated with electronic commerce accelerated at an even more
 astonishing pace. The amount of attention focused on "e-business" by
 business managers, lawmakers, and the mass media reached unparalleled
 heights, exacerbating a wide range of controversies regarding what
 changes, if any, need to be made in existing commercial laws to accom-
 modate these innovations. Many of these issues have been debated for
 years, or even decades, among lawyers and managers confronting earlier
 generations of electronic commerce technologies. The migration of both
 paper and computerized business processes to new technologies such as
 the Internet, however, makes these debates suddenly seem very novel and
 very urgent.1 Controversies surrounding law reforms to accommodate a
 new generation of "e-business" have unfolded within state legislatures in
 the United States,2 the uniform law drafting projects sponsored by the
 *Ms. Winn is an Associate Professor at Southern Methodist University School of Law, a
 member of the New York Bar, and co-author of The Law of Electronic Commerce. Copies of
 her recent publications on the law of electronic commerce are available from her web site
 at <http://www.smu.edu/~jwinn>. Mr. Pullen is an associate with Dibb, Lupton and Alsop
 in the firm's Brussels, Belgium office, where he specializes in the law of the European Union
 (EU) and electronic commerce developments. The authors would like to thank Amelia Boss,
 Timothy Davis, John Gregory, Ian Grigg, Peter Weiss, Michael White, and William Wood-
 ward for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.
 1 . For an overview of how earlier generations of electronic commerce technologies and
 commercial law reform efforts differ from the current controversies surrounding Internet
 commerce, see Jane Kaufman Winn, Open Systems, Free Markets, and Regulation of Internet Com-
 merce, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1 177 (1998). For a more detailed discussion of many legal issues that
 first emerged in the discussion of electronic contracting in the 1 980s that remain relevant to
 Internet electronic contracting, see generally Benjamin Wright & Jane K. Winn, The
 Law of Electronic Commerce (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 1999).
 2. For an annotated summary of state and federal legislation, as well as legislation outside
 the United States on electronic commerce and digital signature issues, see McBride Baker &
 455
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 National Conference of Commissioners for Uniform State Laws
 (NCCUSL),3 the U.S. Congress,4 the United Nations Commission on In-
 ternational Trade Law (UNCITRAL),5 the EU,6 and many other national
 legislatures around the world.7
 Coles, Summary of Electronic Commerce and Distal Signature L·gL·lation (visited Aug. 22, 1999)
 <http://wvvw.mbc.com/ecommerce.html>. For a general description of public key cryptog-
 raphy and digital signatures, see, e.g., WARWICK FORD & MICHAEL S. Baum, SECURE
 Electronic Commerce (1997); Simson Garfinkel with Gene Spafford, Web Se-
 curity and Commerce 187-208 (1998); Wright & Winn, supra note 1, § 3.06[D].
 Legislation dealing with digital signatures often refers to certain roles played by parties
 using public key cryptography in different capacities. Public key cryptography uses two dif-
 ferent, but inextricably related, encryption "keys" to encrypt and decrypt messages. An in-
 dividual using a "private" key to digitally sign documents will normally ask a trusted third
 party to issue a certificate so that other individuals will have confidence that the digital
 signature accurately identifies that individual. The individual seeking a certificate will turn
 over the public key, retaining exclusive control at all times of the private key. The third party
 issuing the certificate that identifies the individual and contains a copy of that person's public
 key is often called a "certification authority" (CA). The signing party is often called a "sub-
 scriber" because he or she has subscribed to the CA's certification service by submitting
 identification information and a copy of his or her public key. A party who asks to see a
 digital signature certificate issued by a third party before relying on a digital signature is often
 called a "relying party." The environment within which individuals can rely on each other's
 digital signatures because of the trust created by the issuance of certificates by CAs is often
 called a "public key infrastructure" (PKI). See generally RSA's crypto FAQ <http://
 www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/faq> (providing information on public key cryptography).
 3. Information about uniform law drafting projects addressing electronic commerce issues
 is available on NCCUSL's World Wide Web (web) site at <http://www.nccusl.org>. The
 texts of current and prior drafts of the Uniform Law Commissioners' (ULC) are available
 on a web site maintained by the University of Pennsylvania. See Drafts of Uniform and
 Model Acts Official Site (visited Sept. 5, 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
 ulc.htm>. The electronic contracting provisions of the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
 (UETA) and the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCITA) are discussed
 infra notes 10-132.
 4. In August 1999, the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act,
 H.R. 1714, 106th Cong. (1999), and the Third Millennium Electronic Commerce Act, S.
 761, 106th Cong. (1999) were pending in Congress. These bills are discussed infra notes
 133-48.
 5. In 1995, the UNCITRAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce (WG-EC) com-
 pleted a model law on electronic commerce and is currently preparing a model law on
 electronic signatures. Information about the deliberations of the WG-EC are available on
 the UNCITRAL web site. See Recent Documents of UNCITRAL and its Working Groups:
 Working Group on Electronic Commerce (visited Aug. 22, 1999) <http://www.uncitral.org/
 english/sessions/wg_ec/index.htm>. The work of the WG-EC is discussed infra notes
 225-30.
 6. Information about legal aspects of the electronic commerce initiatives of the Com-
 mission of the EU is available from its web site. See Electronic Commerce and the European
 Union (visited Aug. 22, 1999) <http://www.ispo.cec.be/ecommerce/legal/legal.html>. Pro-
 posed directives on electronic commerce and electronic signatures as well as proposed reg-
 ulations governing jurisdiction over online consumer transactions are discussed infra notes
 149-206.
 7. See McBride Baker & Coles, supra note 2 (discussing developments in other countries).
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 This Article will provide a short overview of the current efforts in the
 United States and the EU to reform contract law to accommodate recent
 innovations in electronic contracting.8 Whether changes are needed to
 current contract law doctrines governing contract formation, effectiveness
 of contract terms, choice of law and forum provisions, special protections
 for consumers, and signature and writing requirements, revisions in these
 areas have all proved controversial. Even in those areas where a consensus
 may be emerging on whether law reform may be appropriate in some
 form, consensus is often still lacking with regard to the specific legislation
 needed to accomplish those reforms. The United States is not the only
 major arena where such reforms are being debated. The EU is addressing
 the same problems, but taking a markedly different approach. If the
 United States and EU commit themselves to divergent approaches to the
 regulation of electronic contracting, major obstacles will be placed
 in the paths of businesses hoping to exploit global electronic markets.
 Businesses may then be forced to design their electronic commerce systems
 to conform to multiple, incompatible legal standards, or face the prospect
 of being shut out of major markets for electronic commerce services
 altogether.9
 UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION INITIATIVES
 In 1988, the Permanent Editorial Board (PEB) of the Uniform Com-
 mercial Code (U.C.C.) appointed a study committee to determine whether
 revisions were needed to Article 2 of the U.C.C. In 1991, the ULC and
 the American Law Institute (ALI) appointed a drafting committee to begin
 revising U.C.C. Article 2, acting on the recommendations of the commit-
 tee.10 In addition to other objectives, these revisions were supposed to
 8. See Amelia H. Boss, Electronic Commerce and the Symbiotic Relationship Between International
 and Domestic Law Reform, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1931 (1998) [hereinafter Boss, Electronic Commerce]',
 Amelia H. Boss, Searching for Secunty in the Law of Electronic Commerce, 23 No VA L. Rev. 585
 (1999); Jeff C. Dodd &James A. Hernandez, Contracting in Cyberspace, 3 COMPUTER L. Rev.
 & Tech. J. 1 (1998); Raymond T. Nimmer, Electronic Contracting: Ugal Issues, 14J. MARSHALL
 J. Computer & Info. L. 21 1 (1996).
 9. See, e.g., Department of State, Office of the Legal Advisor Memorandum Regarding
 International Electronic Commerce Projects, 4 Electronic Com. & L. Rep. (BNA) 472 (May
 26, 1999). The use of electronic commerce regulatory standards as a form of non-tariff trade
 barrier has been widely debated in the context of the EU Directive on the Protection of
 Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of
 Such Data and the determination by the EU that U.S. law does not currently provide ade-
 quate privacy safeguards to permit free transfers of data from the EU to the United States.
 See P. Amy Monahan, Deconstructing Information Walk: The Impact of the European Data Directive
 on U.S. Businesses, 29 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 275, 287 (1998); Directive on the Protection
 of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement
 of Such Data, Council Directive 95/46/EC, 1995 OJ. (L 281) 31, available in <http://
 wwweuropa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/dataprot/news/925.htm>.
 1 0. See PEB Study Group, PEB Study Group Report: Uniform Commercial Code, Article 2 Executive
 Summary, 46 Bus. Law. 1869 (1991).
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 remove impediments to electronic commerce found in Article 2, such as
 the current text of the Statute of Frauds provisions which could be inter-
 preted as requiring the use of paper to constitute a writing. The Article 2
 revision process originally included software licensing, but after the 1995
 failure of the "hub and spokes" approach to revising Article 2, software
 licensing was removed from it and a separate U.C.C. Article 2B drafting
 committee was formed. A separate drafting committee was also established
 to make any changes needed to keep U.C.C. Article 2 A, which governs
 leasing transactions, compatible with the revised Article 2 and the pro-
 posed Article 2B.
 The revision of Article 2 and the drafting of Article 2B proved fairly
 controversial in some areas affecting electronic commerce. Article 2B en-
 countered substantial criticism from: (i) consumer groups who believed the
 draft was too accommodating to the software industry,11 (ii) the "copyright
 industries" who believed that the scope of Article 2B was too broad and
 who sought to have their industries excluded from its coverage,12 and (iii)
 those who felt that Article 2B would disturb the current boundaries be-
 tween state contract law governing licensing and federal law governing
 intellectual property rights in undesirable ways.13 Throughout 1998 and
 1999, the Article 2B drafting committee made efforts to respond to the
 concerns of these and other groups with revisions to its text. In April 1999,
 when it became clear that Article 2B might not garner the support it
 needed to gain the approval of the ALI,14 the ULC announced its inten-
 tion to change Article 2B into a freestanding uniform law outside the
 11. See, e.g., Letter from Steve Brobeck, Consumer Federation of America, Todd Paglia,
 Consumer Project on Technology, Linda Golodner, National Consumers League, Edmund
 Mierzwinski, U.S. Public Interest Group, to Charles Allen Wright, President of ALI, and
 Gene Lebrun, President of NCCUSL (Nov. 10, 1998), in <http://www.cptech.org/ucc/
 sign-on. html>.
 12. See, e.g., Letter from Vans Stevenson, Senior Vice President, Motion Picture Associa-
 tion of America, to Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Chair, U.C.C. 2B Drafting Committee (Nov. 9,
 1998), in <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/mpaall98.html> [hereinafter MPAA Letter].
 The copyright industries include the film, television, radio, music, and publishing industries.
 13. See, e.g., Amendment to Article 2B Uniform Commercial Code, Proposed by Harvey
 Perlman, Nebraska Commissioner on Uniform State Laws (visited Oct. 10, 1999), in
 <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/2B-amend.html>. This proposal was approved by the
 ULC at its annual meeting: in luly 1998.
 14. In order for U.C.C. Article 2B to become part of the official text of the U.C.C, it
 requires the approval of both the ALI and the ULC at their respective annual meetings. At
 its December Executive Council Meeting, the ALI removed consideration of U.C.C. Article
 2B from the agenda for its May 1999 annual meeting. Even if the ULC had approved U.C.C.
 Article 2B at its annual meeting in July 1999, U.C.C. Article 2B could not have been finalized
 before the ALI annual meeting in May 2000. In May 1999, the three ALI members of the
 drafting committee, David Bartlett, Amy Boss, and David Rice, declined to continue their
 participation in the drafting committee due to concerns over UCITA's suitability for enact-
 ment in its current form. See Memorandum from David Bartlett, Amy Boss, and David Rice,
 to the UCITA Drafting Committee (May 7, 1999), in <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/
 50799dad.html>.
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 U.C.C., the UCITA.15 At its annual meeting in July 1999, the ULC fi-
 nalized UCITA over opposition from consumer groups,16 the entertain-
 ment and publishing industries,17 and some participants in the software
 industry.18
 Revised Article 2 encountered substantial criticism from trade and in-
 dustry groups, who were concerned with the increase in the uncertainty
 of business transactions,19 the lack of adequate justification for its changes
 to current law,20 and the notion that the proposal tipped the current bal-
 ance between merchant and consumer interests in favor of consumers.21
 Throughout 1998 and 1999, the Article 2 drafting committee made efforts
 to respond to criticism from trade and industry groups with revisions to
 the text of revised Article 2. Following changes addressing these concerns,
 revised Article 2 was approved by the ALI at its annual meeting in May
 1999, and like UCITA, was considered by the ULC at its annual meeting
 in July 1999. Although revised U.C.C. Article 2 enjoyed the support of
 consumer groups, it was still the subject of considerable criticism from a
 wide range of industry and trade groups. In the face of this concerted
 opposition, the text of revised Article 2 was withdrawn from consideration
 before it was put to a vote at the ULC annual meeting due to concerns
 that it would not achieve uniform enactment if it became final in its then
 current form. In August 1999, the ULC and the ALI announced that a
 new drafting committee had been formed to revise both U.C.C. Articles
 2 and 2A.22 It was unclear when this new drafting committee was expected
 to complete its assignment.
 A drafting committee was also appointed by the ULC in 1996 to begin
 work on a uniform law aimed at supplementing the U.C.C. in removing
 15. See NCCUSL Press Release, NCCUSL to Promulgate Freestanding Uniform Com-
 puter Information Transactions Act, ALI and NCCUSL Announce that Legal Rules for
 Computer Information Will Not Be Part of U.C.C. (visited Oct. 10, 1999), in <http://
 www.nccusl.org/pressrel/2brel.html>.
 16. See, e.g., Letter from Gail Hillebrand, Consumers Union, to NCCUSL (June 21,1 999),
 in <http://www.2beuide.com/docs/cu699.html>.
 17. See, e.g., MPAA Letter, supra note 12.
 18. See, e.g., Letter from Barbara Simons, President of Association for Computing Ma-
 chinery, to NCCUSL (July 12, 1999), in <http://www.acm.org/usacm/copyright/usacm-
 ucita.html>. The Association for Computing Machinery is one of the oldest and largest
 associations for computing professionals in the world.
 19. See, e.g., Motion from William A. Worthington, to ALI (May 14, 1999), in <http://
 www.ali.orff/ali/ 1 999_worthineton.htm>.
 20. See, e.g., Motion from James J. White, to ALI (May 13, 1999), in <http://www.ali.org/
 ali/1999_Whitel.htm>.
 21. See, e.g., Memorandum from the National Association of Manufacturers et al., to the
 U.C.C. Article 2 Drafting Committee (Jan. 29, 1999) (on file with The Business Lawyer, Uni-
 versity of Maryland School of Law).
 22. See NCCUSL Press Release, ALI and NCCUSL Announce New Drafting Committee
 for U.C.C. Articles 2 and 2A (visited Oct. 10, 1999), in <http://www.nccusl.org/pressrel/
 ucc2a2.htm>.
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 obstacles to electronic commerce in state laws.23 In light of the volume of
 state laws enacted to address electronic commerce issues and the clear
 need for greater uniformity in state law in this area, this project was placed
 on a "fast track" by the ULC. Drafting began in 1997 and was completed
 in 1999, and the UETA was approved by the ULC at its annual meeting
 in July 1999.24 Following the 1999 ULC annual meeting, both the UETA
 and UCITA were in final form and available for consideration by state
 legislatures, while revisions to U.C.C. Articles 2 and 2 A (as well as revisions
 to U.C.C. Article 1) were still in the process of being drafted.
 UETA25
 When work began on the UETA in 1996, the drafting committee re-
 viewed various legislative models including the UNCITRAL Model Law
 on Electronic Commerce, the then current draft of proposed U.C.C. Ar-
 ticle 2B, and various draft laws under consideration in different states. The
 scope of the project quickly became one of the most controversial issues
 the drafting committee would have to resolve.26 A consensus eventually
 emerged that the UETA should be "procedural" in nature, merely cre-
 ating an "overlay" of existing law that would keep changes in the under-
 lying substantive law to an absolute minimum. This approach is very
 similar to that taken by the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Com-
 merce.27 In order to aid individual state legislatures in the process of re-
 viewing their existing laws for obstacles to electronic commerce, such as
 paper writing and manual signature requirements, the drafting committee
 developed a list of various existing state laws that might be excluded from
 the scope of the UETA.28
 23. See Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (Draft for Approval, July 23-30,
 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/uecicta/etaam99.htm> [hereinafter UETA
 Draft].
 24. Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (Official Text Approved at NCCUSL Annual
 Conference, July 23-30, 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/
 ueta.htm> [hereinafter UETA]. The UETA text is in its final version, but the UETA's
 Reporters are to submit the final Prefatory notes and comments at a later date. Thus, any
 citation to the UETA's Prefatory notes and comments will be to the Draft for Approval, July
 23-30, 1999. See supra note 23.
 25. Information about the UETA can be obtained from Carol A. Kunze, A Forum for the
 Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (visited Oct. 7, 1999) <http://www.webcom.com/legaled/
 ETAForum>.
 26. UETA Draft, supra note 23, prefatory n.l.
 27. See Boss, Electronic Commerce, supra note 8, at 1963-68; A. Brooke Overby, UNCITRAL
 Model Law on Electronic Commerce: Will Cyberlaw Be Uniform?, 7 Tul. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 219,
 224 (1999); see also infra text accompanying notes 207-24 (discussing the UNCITRAL Model
 Law on Electronic Commerce).
 28. UETA Draft, supra note 23, § 103(b) n.2. The drafting committee was assisted in its
 consideration of scope issues by the NCCUSL. NCCUSL, Uniform Electronic Transaction
 Act, Task Force on State Law Exclusions Report (Sept. 21, 1998), in <http://www.
 webcom.com/legaled/ETAForum/docs/report4.html>.
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 While early drafts of the UETA included provisions dealing with con-
 tract formation using electronic media and presumptions associating legal
 consequences with the use of more secure authentication technologies for
 signature functions, these provisions were later removed as inconsistent
 with the "procedural" orientation of the statute.29 The drafting committee
 also considered, and then rejected, suggestions that heightened legal pro-
 tections should be given to electronic records and signatures, which have
 been created and "used in conformity with security procedures which
 demonstrate greater reliability."30
 The removal of these provisions was quite controversial, as some ob-
 servers at the drafting committee meetings felt very strongly that an elec-
 tronic commerce enabling statute should address such questions regarding
 the rights and responsibilities of certificate authorities and parties relying
 on digital signature certificates.31 A common feature of technology-specific
 legislation is a provision that associates particular legal outcomes with the
 use of particular technologies, either through the use of evidentiary pre-
 sumptions or through liability rules.32 The UETA avoids the use of either
 by providing that an electronic record or signature is attributable to a
 person only if it was in fact the act of that person.33 The act of the person
 may be proven in any manner, including the showing of the efficacy of a
 security procedure used, but the party with the burden of proof enjoys no
 evidentiary presumption to facilitate the proof The context and surround-
 ing circumstances of the creation, execution, and adoption of an electronic
 record or signature should be taken into account in determining its effect.
 The UETA did follow recent U.C.C. revisions in using the term "rec-
 ord" as a media-neutral alternative to the term "writing."34 Unlike the
 29. One example of this general observation is § 1 1 3 of the UETA Draft, which would
 have validated contracts formed by the interaction of electronic agents. UETA Draft, supra
 note 23, § 113.
 30. Id. orefatorv n. 1 .
 31. See supra note 2 (explanating certificate authorities, relying parties, and digital signature
 certificates).
 32. One of the first detailed statements of the technology-specific approach is contained
 in the ABA Digital Signature Guidelines, published in 1996. Information Security Com-
 mittee, ABA Section of Science and Technology, Digital Signature Guidelines
 (1996), available in <http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/dsgfree.html>. For an overview
 of arguments supporting a more technology-specific approach, see Thomas J. Smedinghoff
 & Ruth Hill Bro, Moving With Change: Electronic Signature L·gislation as a Vehicle for Advancing E-
 Commerce, 17 J. Marshall Computer & INFO. L. Rev. 723 (1999). For a critique of such
 provisions as unfair and economically inefficient, see Comment from Carl Ellison & Jane
 Kaufman Winn, to the Federal Trade Commission on Consumer Protection in the Global
 Electronic Marketplace (Mar. 26, 1999), in <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/icpw/comments/
 revwin~ 1 .htm> .
 33. UETA, supra note 24, § 9.
 34. For example, in the 1999 revisions to U.C.C. Article 9, "record" is defined as "infor-
 mation that is inscribed on a tangible medium or which is stored in an electronic or other
 medium and is retrievable in perceivable form." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(69) (1999).
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 recent revision of U.C.C. Article 935 and UCITA,36 however, the UETA
 does not define a new term "authenticate" to take the place of the tra-
 ditional term "signature." The drafting committee concluded that the cur-
 rent U.C.C. definition of "signature"37 and the common law definition of
 signature38 are sufficiently flexible to accommodate the needs of electronic
 commerce without any modifications. Furthermore, efforts to nail down
 such an amorphous and multifaceted concept as "signature" in order to
 update it run the risk of being overinclusive or underinclusive, thus cre-
 ating a substantive change in the law. The UETA, therefore, provides only
 a definition of "electronic signature,"39 not a media-neutral restatement
 of the concept of "signature" in general. A determination as to whether
 an electronic signature exists would be made in light of all the surrounding
 circumstances.40 The definition of "electronic signature" should be suffi-
 ciently broad to cover either an Internet click-through contracting process
 in which a person clicks on some element in the graphical user interface
 such as an "I agree" button in order to indicate an intent to be legally
 bound, or the use of a digital signature within a PKI.
 The objective of the UETA is only to facilitate electronic commerce,
 not to mandate the adoption of new technologies by any party.41 The
 UETA applies "only to transactions between parties each of which has
 agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means."42 As with an elec-
 tronic signature, the context and surrounding circumstances should be
 taken into account in determining whether there is an agreement to con-
 35. For example, in the 1999 revisions to U.C.C. Article 9, "authenticate" means: "(A) to
 sign; or (B) to execute or otherwise adopt a symbol, or encrypt or similarly process a record
 in whole or in part, with the present intent of the authenticating person to identify the person
 and adopt or accept a record." Id. § 9-102(a)(7).
 36. Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act § 102(6) (Draft Approved at
 NCCUSL Annual Conference, July 23-30, 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
 ulc_frame.htm> ("Authenticate means to sign, or otherwise to execute or adopt an electronic
 symbol, sound, or process attached to, included in, or logically associated or linked with, a
 record or term, with the intent to sign the record or a record to which it refers.") [hereinafter
 UCITA]. Please note that all citations to UCITA are to the July 1999 draft unless otherwise
 specified.
 37. U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (1995) defines "[s]igned" to include "any symbol executed or
 adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing."
 38. A signature is any mark or symbol affixed to a writing to manifest the signer's intent
 to adopt it as his or her own and to be bound by it. &£just Pants v. Wagner, 617 N.E.2d
 246, 251 (111. App. Ct. 1993); see also Winn, supra note 1, at 1216-21 (discussing the U.S.
 common law of signatures).
 39. UETA, supra note 24, § 2(8) (stating that "[electronic signature" means "an electronic
 sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a record and executed or
 adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record").
 40. UETA Draft, supra note 23, § 102 n.7.
 41. UETA, supra note 24, § 5(a) ("This [Act] does not require that a record or signature
 be created, generated, sent, communicated, received, stored, or otherwise processed or used
 by electronic means or in electronic form.").
 42. Id. § 5(b).
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 duct transactions electronically.43 Furthermore, even though a party may
 have agreed to conduct one transaction electronically, that party may still
 refuse to conduct subsequent transactions electronically, and this provision
 may not be varied by agreement.44 With regard to government records,
 the UETA gives state legislatures the option of permitting each agency to
 determine under what circumstances electronic records will be created or
 accepted, or designating a single state officer to manage the conversion of
 paper to electronic processes and make such decisions.45
 The heart of the UETA is contained in section 7, which provides that
 "[a] record or signature may not be denied legal effect or enforceability
 solely because it is in electronic form."46 "A contract may not be denied
 legal effect or enforceability solely because an electronic record was used
 in its formation."47 If a law requires a writing or a signature, then an
 electronic record or an electronic signature may satisfy that requirement.48
 In addition, an electronic record or signature may not be excluded from
 introduction into evidence in a legal proceeding merely because it is
 electronic.49
 The UETA provides that, subject to certain qualifications, whenever
 one party is required by other state law to furnish information in writing
 to another, and the parties have already agreed to conduct transactions
 electronically, then that requirement may be met by sending the infor-
 mation in an electronic record, as long as the information in the record is
 sent in a format that can be retained by the recipient.50 If other state law
 requires that a record be posted, displayed, sent, or formatted in a certain
 manner, however, then the UETA does not overrule those other require-
 ments.51 This means, for example, that where a statute now requires notice
 be sent by first class mail, the UETA does not affect that requirement.
 43. Id. § 2(1) (denning "agreement" as "the bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their
 language or inferred from other circumstances and from rules, regulations, and procedures
 given the effect of agreements under laws otherwise applicable to a particular transaction").
 The Reporter's Notes explain that the definition does not specifically include usage of trade
 because to do so might result in an unintended substantive change in other law; however,
 the reference to "other circumstances" should be flexible enough to permit usage of trade
 to be taken into account in an appropriate context. UETA Draft, supra note 23, § 102 n.l.
 44. UETA, supra note 24, § 5(c).
 45. Id. §§ 17-19.
 46. Id. § 7 (a). The Reporter's Notes explain that while a contract may be unenforceable,
 it may still have legal effects, such as when a purchaser of goods under a contract rendered
 unenforceable by the Statute of Frauds insures the goods against loss, and may not have its
 claim in the event of such loss denied by the insurer on the grounds that the contract of sale
 was unenforceable against the seller. UETA Draft, supra note 23, § 106 n.l.
 47. UETA, supra note 24, § 7(b).
 48. Id. § 7(c), (d).
 4-y. Id. § 13.
 50. Id. § 8(a).
 51. Id. §8(b).
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 Furthermore, if information in an electronic record is intended to meet a
 statutory writing requirement, it must not be sent by an information pro-
 cessing system that inhibits the ability to print or download the information
 in the electronic record.52 This would cover such situations as a webwrap
 contract interface where terms and conditions are displayed to the end-
 user, but the end-user has no way to print out on paper the terms and
 conditions being displayed in the Internet browser application, or other-
 wise save an exact copy of that which the end-user is being asked to
 agree.53 The parties may not vary these requirements by agreement, ex-
 cept to the extent that such variation would be permitted by other law.54
 Many state laws currently set forth record retention requirements that
 either require, or might be interpreted as requiring, the retention of paper
 documents.55 For example, it is common for state laws to require parties
 in various contexts to retain copies of canceled checks for a specified
 amount of time. The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston submitted to the
 UETA drafting committee a 1997 report based on information collected
 by all twelve Federal Reserve Banks that identified hundreds of state and
 federal statutes that currently require the retention of canceled checks.56
 The existence of such laws often has a very significant chilling effect on
 parties wishing to convert their current paper-based record-keeping sys-
 tems to electronic systems, so the UETA contains provisions designed to
 facilitate substitution of electronic for paper records in satisfaction of stat-
 utory record retention requirements. Provided the electronic record ac-
 curately reflects the information set forth in the record in its original form,
 and remains accessible for later reference, electronic records may be re-
 tained in lieu of paper records.57 Canceled checks are expressly included
 if they are required to be retained as records.58
 52. Id. § 8(c).
 53. Some observers and members of the drafting committee experienced this problem
 and were unable to resolve it with the standard remedy in such circumstances. In order to
 print a copy of what is displayed on a screen even if there is no print function available in
 the application currently being used, the end-user can usually press the "Print Screen" button
 on the keyboard to transfer whatever is displayed on the screen into the operating system's
 "clipboard." The image in the clipboard can then be transferred to a different application
 and printed out or stored to disk. Some applications have apparently been written to preclude
 this form of copying from taking place.
 54. UETA, supra note 24, § 8(d).
 55. For a discussion of many record retention laws and the ability of parties to substitute
 electronic records for paper originals in satisfaction of those requirements, see Wright &
 WlNN, supra note 1 , pt. III.
 56. Patricia Allouise, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, A Survey of Laws and Regulations
 Relating to Cancelled Checks (1997) (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland
 School of Law).
 57. UETA, supra note 24, § 12(a).
 58. Id. § 12(e). Checks that are still performing a payment function are not covered by
 this section. See id. § 16 (governing " transfer rable records").
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 The UETA has some rather complex provisions governing the time and
 place of sending and receiving electronic records.59 The UETA provides
 that an electronic record is received, even if no one is aware of its receipt.60
 An electronic record is sent when a properly addressed message leaves the
 control of the sender, or enters the control of the recipient.61 Receipt then
 takes place when the message is sent to the address designated by the
 intended recipient, or to a system that the recipient in fact uses to receive
 messages of this type.62 The UETA also provides, for conflict of laws
 purposes, that electronic messages shall be deemed to be received wherever
 the recipient actually conducts his principal business or resides, though this
 legal fiction for conflict of laws purposes has no effect on determining
 whether the message was "received" for purposes of UETA section 15.63
 Even if a message is received for purposes of the UETA, that does not
 establish that the content received corresponds to the content sent.64
 One noteworthy departure from the general principle that the UETA
 is only procedural and makes no changes in substantive law concerns the
 provisions governing transferable records.65 A transferable record is an
 electronic record that would otherwise be a negotiable note under U.C.C.
 Article 3 or a negotiable document under U.C.C. Article 7 if written, and
 that the issuer has agreed is a transferable record.66 The drafting com-
 mittee was unwilling to accept a more broadly drafted provision permitting
 the creation of electronic negotiable instruments generally out of defer-
 ence to the concern of regulators, such as the Federal Reserve Board, that
 the regulatory divide between electronic funds transfers and paper nego-
 tiable instruments must be maintained for bank regulators to be able to
 guarantee the safety and soundness of the U.S. payment system.67 The
 transferrable record provisions of the UETA are drafted to permit indus-
 tries such as the real estate mortgage industry to undertake pilot projects
 involving electronic negotiable notes, while the PEB considers whether
 revisions to U.C.C. Articles 3, 4, and 4A are needed to authorize the use
 59. Id. § 15.
 60. Id. § 15(e).
 61. Id. § 15(a). If both sender and recipient use the same online service provider, for
 example, the message may not leave the control of the sender at all, so the operative event
 would be when the message had reached a part of the online service provider's system that
 the recipient could access, such as an email inbox. UETA Draft, supra note 23, § 1 14(e) n.2.
 62. UETA, supra note 24, § 15(b).
 63. Id. S 15fc), (d): UETA Draft, sutra note 23, § 1 14 n.4.
 64. UETA, supra note 24, S 15(f).
 65. For a more complete discussion of the issues raised by these provisions, see R. David
 Whitaker, Rules Under the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act for an Electronic Equivalent to a Negotiable
 Promissory Note, 55 Bus. Law. 437 (1999).
 66. UETA, supra note 24, § 16(a).
 67. See Memorandum from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, to the ETA
 Drafting Committee (Feb. 1, 1999), in <http://www.webcom.com/legaled/ETAForum/
 docs/frbny.pdf > .
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 of electronic negotiable instruments generally. The UETA provisions gov-
 erning control of transferrable records permit the creation of the func-
 tional equivalent of holder status under current law applicable to paper
 instruments or documents.68
 UCITA69
 UCITA is a major piece of legislation covering a broad spectrum of
 issues affecting licenses of software and computer information, including
 the formation, interpretation, performance, and enforcement of such con-
 tracts in new electronic commerce contexts. The statute contains 1 08 sec-
 tions and, in its final form for approval with a prefatory note and reporter's
 notes, is over 300 pages long. It is beyond the scope of this Article to do
 more than suggest what are some of the major innovations in electronic
 contracting law contained in this statute.70
 Just as in the drafting of the UETA, the scope provisions of UCITA
 were among the most controversial provisions that the drafting committee
 addressed. As its name implies, it applies to "computer information trans-
 actions."71 In other words, UCITA is a contract law statute that covers
 transactions in computer software, multimedia interactive products, com-
 puter data and databases, and Internet and online information.72 In ad-
 dition to provisions governing the licensing of software and other com-
 puter information, UCITA contains provisions governing electronic
 contracting processes used to execute transactions in software and com-
 puter information. UCITA addresses these electronic contracting issues
 because distribution of software and computer information in electronic
 form over computer networks is an important distribution mechanism for
 such products today, and is likely to become more important in the future.
 If a transaction for goods that contain no embedded software is conducted
 electronically, UCITA by its terms would have no application. Until re-
 visions of U.C.C. Article 2 are complete, however, courts and others may
 68. UETA, supra note 24, § 16(b), (c). The control provisions in UETA § 16 are modeled
 after the provisions of revised U.C.C. Article 9 governing electronic chattel paper. For an
 analysis of the concept of control of electronic chattel paper, see Jane K. Winn, Electronic
 Chattel Paper Under Revised Article 9: Updating the Concept of Embodied Rights for Electronic Commerce,
 75 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. (forthcoming 1999).
 69. The following discussion is based on UCITA, supra note 36.
 70. The ULC has posted on its web site a series of papers by Carlyle C. Ring, Jr., Chair
 of Committee to Draft UCITA, and Raymond T. Nimmer, Reporter of Committee to Draft
 UCITA, providing responses to recurring questions on UCITA. See Series of Papers on
 UCITA Issues (visited Oct. 8, 1999) <http://www.nccusl.org/pressrel/UCITAQA.htm>.
 71. UCITA, supra note 36, § 103(a). A "[c]omputer information transaction" is defined
 as "an agreement and the performance of that agreement to create, modify, transfer, or
 license computer information or informational rights in computer information." Id.
 § 102(12).
 72. See UCITA § 103 n.2 (Draft Comments to UCITA, Oct. 15, 1999) <http://www.law.
 upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/citam99.htm> [hereinafter UCITA Draft Comments].
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 look to UCITA for inspiration in analyzing electronic contracting issues.
 It is possible that some courts might even apply by analogy UCITA's
 electronic contracting provisions to transactions in goods if the transac-
 tions are executed electronically.
 The application of UCITA to transactions involving both computer
 information and other subject matter is somewhat complex. In addition,
 the impact of UCITA may be expanded beyond the jurisdiction of any
 state that enacts it.73 This provision was quite controversial in part because
 of possible revisions to the general choice of law provisions contained in
 U.C.C. Article I.74 Critics and proponents of UCITA alike share a per-
 ception that the "freedom of contract" principle in UCITA tends to favor
 more rigorous enforcement of form contracts that would otherwise be the
 case if the current version of U.C.C Article 2 or the common law of
 contracts applied to a transaction.75 Opponents of UCITA were con-
 73. As a general rule, UCITA applies to transactions relating solely to computer infor-
 mation. See UCITA § 103(a) (Draft, Oct. 15, 1999) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
 ulc_frame.htm>. When a transaction involves subject matter other than computer infor-
 mation, UCITA provides two alternative tests for determining its applicability: the primary
 subject matter and material purpose tests, as provided in § 103(b):
 (1) If a transaction includes computer information and goods, this [Act] applies to the
 computer information and informational rights in it. However, if a copy of a computer
 program is contained in and sold or leased as part of other goods, this [Act] applies to
 the copy and the computer program only if:
 (A) the other goods are a computer or computer peripheral; or
 (B) giving the buyer or lessee of the goods access to or use of the program is ordinarily
 a matenal purpose of transactions in goods of the type sold or leased.
 (2) In all cases not involving goods, this [Act] applies only to the computer information
 or informational rights in it, unless the computer information and information rights
 are, or access to them is, the pnmary subject matter, in which case this [Act] applies to the
 entire transaction.
 Id. § 103(b) (emphasis added).
 74. The current default choice of law rule for the U.C.C. is contained in Article 1, which
 applies to any transaction within the scope of the U.C.C. if no more specific choice of law
 rule contained in one of the other articles applies. This choice of law rule currently requires
 that the transaction bear a reasonable relationship to the state whose law is specified by the
 parties in a contract; if the parties have not made a choice, the U.C.C. applies to transactions
 bearing an appropriate relationship to a state that has enacted the U.C.C. See U.C.C.
 § 1-105(1) (1995). During the U.C.C. Article 1 revision process, there has been consideration
 of removing the "reasonable relation" requirement to the contractual choice of law rule in
 Article 1. If Article 1 is revised to remove the "reasonable relation" requirement, and the
 forum state had adopted that version of Article 1 , and had determined that the transaction
 was governed by the U.C.C, the forum state court would probably apply UCITA if that
 was what the parties had specified as the governing law of the contract even if the jurisdiction
 that had enacted UCITA bore no reasonable relationship to the transaction. See generally
 Amelia Boss, The Jurisdiction of Commercial Law: Party Autonomy in Choosing Applicable Law and
 Forum under Proposed Revisions to the U.C.C, 32 Int'l Law. 1067 (1998).
 75. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jean Braucher & Peter Linzer, to Members of ALI
 (May 5, 1998), in <http://www.ali.org/ali/Braucher.htm>; Memorandum from Micalyn S.
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 cerned that even though they might be able to block enactment of it in
 many state legislatures, the growing judicial recognition of the enforce-
 ability of choice of law and choice of forum provisions in contracts com-
 bined with widespread adoption by industry of choice of law provisions
 that point to jurisdictions that have enacted UCITA would give UCITA
 considerable effect even in those jurisdictions where it might have been
 rejected by the state legislature.76 As a result, the final draft of UCITA
 contains provisions designed to assuage the concerns of such critics.77
 In mixed transactions involving both computer information and goods
 or some other subject matter, UCITA applies if the primary purpose of
 the contract revolves around the computer information.78 If any provision
 of the U.C.C. applies to a mixed transaction, then generally UCITA does
 not apply to that extent.79 If a mixed transaction involves financial services,
 entertainment or broadcast content, or an employment relationship, then
 UCITA does not apply at all.80 This scope provision is in marked contrast
 with some of its earlier iterations in proposed U.C.C. Article 2B, which
 applied to "licenses of information and software contracts."81 Such a
 sweeping scope provision might have brought such diverse enterprises as
 the film, television, radio, music, publishing, financial services, research
 and development, and data processing industries within its terms, not to
 mention public libraries and professional services such as law, accounting,
 and consulting where information printed on paper is circulated subject
 to restrictions. The retrenchment of the scope provisions in UCITA rep-
 resents a return to something approaching the original vision of proposed
 U.C.C. Article 2B, which started out in large part as a statute to validate
 shrink-wrap software contracts.
 One provision in UCITA highlights the often indistinct and highly con-
 troversial boundary between copyright and other federal intellectual prop-
 erty law on the one hand, and the law of software licenses governed by
 UCITA on the other.82 This provision was added as a concession to groups
 Harris, Winpro, Inc., to NCCUSL (July 19, 1999), in <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/
 71999mh.html>.
 76. See infra notes 1 12-22 (discussing choice of law and forum provisions in UCITA).
 77. Adoption of UCITA as the governing law of a contract cannot abrogate "an other-
 wise applicable rule [of law] that may not be varied by agreement . . . and in a mass market
 transaction, does not alter" either an applicable consumer protection statute or administrative
 rule, or any law requiring that information be provided in a tangible printed form. UCITA,
 supra note 36, § 103(e)(l).
 78. Id. § 103(b).
 79. Id. § 103(c).
 80. Id. S 103(d).
 81. U.C.C. §2B-103(a) (Tenative Draft Nov. 1, 1997), in <http://www.law.upenn.edu/
 bll/ulc/ucc2/2bnov97.htm>.
 82. UCITA, supra note 36, § 105(a) ("A provision of this [Act] which is preempted by
 federal law is unenforceable to the extent of the preemption.").
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 who were concerned that without a formal statement that federal intellec-
 tual property law will preempt state contract law with regard to any matter
 within the scope of the federal law, the provisions of UCITA might be
 interpreted in a manner that would erode certain intellectual property
 rights such as fair use. In addition, UCITA provides that if a term of a
 contract "violates a fundamental public policy," the court may limit the
 enforcement of the contract as necessary to avoid any result contrary to
 public policy.83 A court may, therefore, refuse to enforce, or limit as ap-
 propriate the enforcement of unconscionable contracts or terms governed
 by UCITA.84
 UCITA contains a provision that is virtually identical to those in the
 UETA and the UN Model Law on Electronic Commerce requiring that
 a record or authentication not be denied legal effect or enforceability
 merely because it is electronic form.85 In keeping with the basic policy
 promoting freedom of contract, UCITA provides that nothing in it can
 be construed to require that a record or authentication be electronic.86
 Furthermore, a contract formed through the use of an electronic agent
 will be binding on the person using the agent, even if no one was aware
 of or reviewed the agent's operations or the results of the operations.87
 UCITA provides that in any transaction, a person may establish re-
 quirements regarding the type of the authentication or record acceptable
 to it.88 This is similar to the very general enabling language used in the
 proposed federal legislation currently before Congress,89 and is in marked
 83. Id. § 105(b). Considerable concern was expressed during the drafting process that
 strong enforcement of information licenses would effectively put public libraries out of busi-
 ness in the near future when content is more likely to be delivered electronically than on the
 printed page. Erosion of the kind of rights in information embodied in the copyright doctrine
 of fair use are an example of a public policy that might lead a court to limit the enforcement
 of an information license. See, e.g., Letter from David Bender, Special Libraries Association,
 Carol C. Henderson, American Library Association, Robert Oakley, American Association
 of Law Libraries, Duane E. Webster, Association of Research Libraries, to Carlyle Ring,
 Chair, U.C.C. 2B Drafting Committee (Oct. 8, 1998), in <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/
 librlO98.html>.
 84. UCITA, supra note 36, § lll(a). The parties may not disclaim their obligations of
 good faith, reasonableness, diligence, or care, although they may by agreement set standards
 for meeting those obligations if those standards are not manifestly unreasonable. Id.
 § 104(c)(l).
 85. Id. § 107(a); UETA, supra note 24, § 7(a); see also infra notes 210-24 and accompanying
 text (discussing UNCITRAL Model Law). "Record" is a technology-neutral term that en-
 compasses both paper and electronic writings; " [authenticate" is a technology-neutral term
 that encompasses both manual and electronic signatures. UCITA, supra note 36, § 102(6),
 (58).
 86. UCITA, supra note 36, § 107(b).
 87. Id. § 107(d); see abo id. §§ 202, 206 (regarding the legal effect of using electronic agents).
 88. Id. § 107(c).
 89. See infra notes 133-48 and accompanying text.
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 contrast with the more nuanced provisions in the UETA90 and in the draft
 European Commission (EC or Commission) Directive on electronic com-
 merce now under consideration in the EU.91 Abstract language affirming
 freedom of contract as a fundamental principle may appear neutral and
 even-handed on its face. When applied to transactions where one party is
 substantially more sophisticated than the other, has substantially more bar-
 gaining power, or in the electronic commerce context has control over the
 design of the interface, however, such a general statement may operate in
 fact as a license to sophisticated corporate transactors to impose inefficient
 or grossly inequitable terms on less sophisticated parties through contracts
 of adhesion. One way to temper the discretion of the electronic commerce
 merchant in drawing up its standard form contract and designing the user
 interface while preserving a meaningful exercise of freedom of contract
 by the consumer would be to require certain minimum procedural safe-
 guards for consumers. For example, any agreement by a consumer to the
 use of electronic communications media or records might be denied effect
 unless it is given by the consumer using the same form of electronic media
 as that the consumer is agreeing to use in the future. Such procedural
 requirements would minimize the likelihood that, for example, consumers
 who do not have access to computers would find themselves deemed to
 have accepted notices contained in records posted to Internet web sites.92
 Some of the most important provisions of UCITA clarify the legal
 status of new forms of electronic contracting, such as clicking on an "I
 agree" icon displayed on an Internet browser. UCITA provides that au-
 thentication may be proven in any manner, including showing that a party
 90. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. For example, the UETA grants parties
 a non-waivable right to withdraw consent to the use of electronic media at any time, and
 requires that if the parties have agreed to conduct transactions electronically, and a law
 requires a person to provide, send, or deliver information in writing to another person, that
 requirement is met by the use of an electronic record only if the information is in a format
 that the recipient can retain. UETA, supra note 24, §§ 5(c), 8(a).
 91. See infra notes 154-75 and accompanying text; see abo Commission of the European
 Communities, Amended Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
 Council Directive Concerning the Distance Marketing of Consumer Financial Services and
 Amending Council Directives 97/7/EC and 98/27/EC, COM(99)385 final art.3a f 1,
 available in <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgl 5/en/finances/consumer/disselen.htm>
 [hereinafter Proposal Concerning Distance Marketing]; Directive 97/7/EC of the European
 Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the Protection of Consumers in Respect
 of Distance Contracts, 1997 OJ. (L 144) 19, art. 5, in <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/
 dg24/policy/developments/dist_sell/dist01_en.html> (requiring that a supplier communi-
 cate contractual conditions in writing or in another durable medium available and accessible
 to consumer) [hereinafter Distance Selling Directive] .
 92. Proponents of UCITA might argue that UCITA does not require more specific pro-
 cedural controls to protect consumers from such merchant overreaching because such mer-
 chant practices could be invalidated by a court under various provisions of UCITA, including
 those limiting enforcement for lack of good faith, unconscionability, or violation of a fun-
 damental public policy. UCITA, supra note 36, §§ 104(c)(l), 105(b), 1 1 l(a).
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 made use of information or access that could only have been available if
 it engaged in conduct or operations that authenticated the record or
 term.93 This provision will validate electronic contracting practices such
 as displaying screens that the end-user must click through before being
 granted access to certain functions on the vendor's system or being sold
 or licensed certain goods or services. Anecdotal evidence suggests that
 many online vendors using such an interface would be able to establish
 what content was displayed to the end-user, that the user had accessed
 successively the files containing the content, and that because of the graph-
 ical user interface design, unless the appropriate responses had been given
 by the end-user, the granting of access or delivery of goods or services
 would not have taken place. Many merchants using such contracting in-
 terfaces are apparently not preserving a separate copy of the content com-
 bined with some particular form of electronic signature for each trans-
 action executed electronically.94
 A more general provision designed to reduce uncertainty about the legal
 efficacy of electronic contracting is found in the manifestation of assent
 provisions.95 The term "manifest assent" is taken from section 19 of the
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts.^ In UCITA, a party manifests assent to a
 record or term if the party has first had an opportunity to review its
 contents, and then either authenticates the record or term, or intentionally
 engages in conduct or makes statements calculated to make the other party
 believe the person is manifesting assent.97 Opportunity to review means
 either the term or record was made available in a manner so that a rea-
 sonable person ought to have noticed it and understood its significance.98
 Comment 5 to UCITA section 1 12 provides two illustrations to clarify the
 93. Id. § 107(d).
 94. UCITA also retains a Statute of Frauds provision for contracts requiring payment of
 $5000 or more, however, which such contracting practices would not seem to meet. It requires
 that "the party against which enforcement is sought authenticated a record sufficient to
 indicate that a contract has been formed and which reasonably identifies the copy or subject
 matter to which the contract refers." Id. § 201(a)(l).
 95. Id. § 112.
 96. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 19 (1979). Section 19 concerning con-
 duct as manifestation of assent provides:
 (1) The manifestation of assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken
 words or by other acts or by failure to act. (2) The conduct of a party is not effective
 as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in the conduct and knows
 or has reason to know that the other party may infer from his conduct that he assents.
 (3) The conduct of a party may manifest assent even though he does not in fact assent.
 In such cases a resulting contract may be voidable because of fraud, duress, mistake, or
 other invalidating cause.
 Id.
 97. UCITA, supra note 36, § 1 12(a).
 98. Id. ξ H2(e)(i).
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 meaning of this provision in the context of Internet contracting." In the
 first, the registration screen prominently states: " Tlease read the License.
 It contains important terms about your use and our obligations with re-
 spect to the information. If you agree to the license, indicate this by click-
 ing on the Ί agree' button. If you do not agree, click Ί decline.' "10° In
 the second illustration, the first computer screen asks the potential licensee
 to enter a name, address and credit card number. After entering the in-
 formation, and striking the "enter" key, the licensee has access to the data
 and receives a monthly bill. In the center of the screen amid other lan-
 guages in small print, is the statement: " 'Terms and conditions of service;
 disclaimers' indicating a hyperlink to the terms. The customer's attention
 is not called to the sentence, nor is the customer asked to react to it."101
 The note indicates that in the first illustration, the licensee has ' 'mani-
 fest [ed] asset to the license and adopts its terms," but in the second illus-
 tration, the licensee has assented to a contract, but not to the "terms of
 service."102
 If the term was only made available for review after a person becomes
 obligated to pay or begins its performance, it may nevertheless be enforce-
 able provided: (i) a person has a right to a return for subsequently unac-
 ceptable disclosed terms, (ii) the record proposes a modification of the
 contract, or (iii) in a case other than a mass market transaction, the parties
 may have an opportunity to review a record or term in the contract.103
 These provisions affirm the holdings in the recent cases involving the Gate-
 way 2000, Inc. (Gateway) computer company.104 Consumer advocates and
 some legal academics felt these provisions nevertheless represented a de-
 parture from prior law regarding the post-sale disclaimers, and rather than
 preserving a consumer's right to an opportunity to review, were tanta-
 mount to imposing on consumers an obligation to scrutinize all the terms
 of a merchant's form contracts.105




 103. Id. §112(e)(3)(A),(B),(D).
 104. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 E3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Brower v. Gateway
 2000, 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1998). In both Gateway cases dealing with post-sale disclosures, the
 courts upheld the validity of the form contracts that Gateway enclosed when shipping com-
 puters sold by telephone order because the purchaser had a right to return the computer
 within 30 days if the terms were not acceptable. See Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150; Brower, 676
 N.Y.S.2d at 573-75. In Brower, however, the court held the arbitration clause unconscionable
 and therefore unenforceable. Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 574-75.
 105. See, e.g., Letter from 45 Law Professors, to Gene Lebrun, President of NGCUSL
 (July 16, 1999), in <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/799profs.html>. One of the authors of
 this Article was among the 45 law professors who signed the July 1 6, 1 999 letter. See abo
 Letter from Professor Ray Nimmer, UGITA Reporter, in Response to 45 Law Professors
 (July 17, 1999), in <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/rrn43.html>.
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 With regard to the legal effect of attribution procedures,106 UCITA now
 follows the technology neutral approach taken in UETA.107 This change
 was made very shortly before UCITA was finalized. Prior to that last-
 minute change, UCITA followed a more technology specific approach
 designed to associate specific legal outcomes with the use of technologies
 believed to be particularly reliable.108 Variations of this "technology spe-
 cific" approach have already been accepted by several state legislatures in
 the United States, and is being considered in some form in the proposed
 EU Electronic Signature Directive, and in the draft UNCITRAL Uniform
 Rules on Electronic Signatures.109
 One provision in UCITA clarifies the enforceability of releases, a par-
 ticular form of contract that is quite common in online environments, but
 which may appear to be fatally flawed under classical contract law doc-
 trines of consideration.110 A party distributing information over the Inter-
 net may want to condition access to that information on an agreement
 from each party accessing it that the provider will not be sued if the
 accessing party is dissatisfied with or aggrieved by the content. For ex-
 106. An "attribution procedure" is defined as
 a procedure established by law, administrative rule, or agreement, or a procedure oth-
 erwise adopted by the parties, to verify that an electronic event is that of a specific
 person or to detect changes or errors in the information. The term includes a procedure
 that requires the use of algorithms or other codes, identifying words or numbers, en-
 cryption, callback or other acknowledgment, or any other procedures that are reason-
 able under the circumstances.
 UCITA, supra note 36, § 102(a)(5).
 107. UCITA §214 now provides:
 (a) An electronic event is attributed to a person if it was the act of that person or its
 electronic agent, or the person is otherwise bound by it under the law of agency or
 other law. The party relying on attribution of an electronic event to another person has
 the burden of establishing attribution.
 (b) The act of a person may be shown in any manner, including a showing of the
 efficacy of an attribution procedure.
 (c) The effect of an electronic act attributed to a person under subsection (a) is deter-
 mined from the context and surrounding circumstances at the time of its creation,
 execution, or adoption, including the parties' agreement, if any, and otherwise as pro-
 vided by law.
 Id. §214.
 108. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
 109. For an analysis of digital signature laws enacted by state legislatures in the U.S., see
 McBride Baker & Coles, supra note 2. For a discussion of the EU draft Electronic Signature
 Directive and the UNCITRAL Uniform Rules on Electronic Signatures, see infra text ac-
 companying notes 1 76-78 and 225-30.
 110. UCITA, supra note 36, § 207. This section provides in part: "A release is effective
 without consideration if it is: (1) in a record to which the releasing party agrees, such as by
 manifesting assent, and which identifies the informational rights released; or (2) enforceable
 under estoppel, implied license, or other rules of law." Id.
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 ample, a party maintaining an Internet "chat room" might require anyone
 wishing to read the messages to release the chat room operator from any
 liability for the content of the messages. It may be hard to argue, though,
 that when the accessing party agrees not to sue the chat room operator,
 even if the content of messages posted in the chat room would otherwise
 be actionable, that should constitute the consideration offered by the ac-
 cessing party, making the release a valid contract. While the chat room
 operator could still raise estoppel arguments if an agreement not to sue
 was found not to be consideration, the chat room operator may be con-
 cerned about the enforceability of the release agreement against the ac-
 cessing party and the chat room operator may simply shut down the chat
 room.111
 The choice of law112 and choice of forum113 provisions in UCITA
 would give merchants entering into electronic contracts greater certainty
 that they would not be forced to litigate disputed transactions in remote
 jurisdictions.114 UCITA provides that the parties may choose the appli-
 cable law governing their transactions without any limitation, such as re-
 quiring the jurisdiction whose law was chosen to bear a reasonable rela-
 tionship to the transaction. It also provides, however, that this choice will
 not be "enforceable in a consumer contract to the extent it would vary a
 rule that may not be varied by agreement under the law of the jurisdiction
 whose law would apply ... in the absence of the agreement" by the par-
 ties.115 In the absence of an enforceable choice of law term, access con-
 tracts1 16 or contracts for electronic delivery of a copy are governed by the
 law of the jurisdiction where the licensor is located, while a consumer
 contract involving delivery of a copy on a physical medium is governed
 by the law of the jurisdiction where the copy is delivered to the consumer.
 In all other cases, the law of the jurisdiction with the most significant
 relationship to the transaction governs.117 These rules clearly favor cer-
 111. For a discussion of the importance to a certificate authority of conditioning access
 to information contained in a certificate revocation list on receiving an enforceable agreement
 from the accessing party not to sue the certificate authority for inaccurate information in the
 certificate, see Jane K. Winn, The Hedgehog and the Fox: Distinguishing Public and Private Sector
 Approaches to Managing Risk for Internet Transactions, 51 Admin. L. Rev. 955, 972-73 (1999).
 112. UCITA, supra note 36, § 109.
 113. Id. §110.
 1 14. For an overview of how the choice of law provisions evolved during the U.C.C. 2B
 drafting process, see Boss, supra note 74 (discussing the jurisdiction of commercial law).
 1 15. UCITA, supra note 36, § 109(a).
 1 16. UCITA § 102(a)(l) defines "access contract" as "a contract to obtain electronically
 access to, or information from, an information processing system of another person, or the
 equivalent of such access."
 117. Id. § 109(b)(3). If the application of this rule points to a foreign jurisdiction which
 does not provide substantially similar protections and rights to a party not located in that
 jurisdiction to those provided by UCITA, then the court may apply the law of the U.S.
 jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the transaction instead. Id. § 109(c).
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 tainty on the part of merchants and, except in the case of mandatory
 consumer protection laws,118 shift the risk of learning the substance of the
 law applicable to the transaction from the merchant to the consumer. This
 approach is in marked contrast to the EU approach, which currently re-
 quires all Member States to revise their consumer protection laws to pro-
 vide a standardized, comprehensive array of mandatory consumer pro-
 tections that apply to electronic contracting to permit merchants to follow
 the law of their home country without depriving consumers of an ade-
 quate level of protection.119
 The choice of forum provisions in UCITA120 are even more favorable
 to merchants wishing to minimize the risk of being haled into court in a
 remote jurisdiction in connection with a contract executed electronically.
 Such a rule is consistent with some recent cases governing contractual
 choice of forum clauses, including those in consumer contracts, such as in
 Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Schute.121 As a practical matter, granting such
 broad discretion to the contract drafter without any limitation for its ap-
 plication to consumer contracts will effectively deprive many consumers
 in online transactions from any effective remedy in the event of a dispute.
 This approach is also in marked contrast with current proposals in the EU
 to revise the 1968 Brussels Convention to apply to contracts involving new
 forms of electronic communications media.122
 118. It is unclear how many consumer protection laws in the United States will be found
 to constitute mandatory consumer protections applicable to transactions within the scope of
 UCITA. Most U.S. consumer protection laws date from the 1960s and 1970s and as a result,
 may not regulate many of the special characteristics of "computer information transactions."
 Cf. id. ξ 103(a).
 1 19. The Distance Selling Directive was promulgated in 1997, and legislation based on
 it must be enacted by the Member States by 2000. See infra notes 195-206 and accompanying
 text. Under the principle of country of origin regulation and mutual recognition of regu-
 lation by Member States, a merchant need only comply with the law where the merchant is
 established. Once all Member States have enacted legislation based on the Distance Selling
 Directive, this will nevertheless provide consumers with a uniformly high level of protection
 throughout the EU. EU Member States are also parties to the 1980 Rome Convention on
 Contractual Choice of Law, which follows UCITA in limiting the enforcement of contractual
 choice of law provisions where they conflict with a mandatory consumer protection law. See
 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19, 1998, 80/934/
 EEC, 1980 OJ. (L 266) 1, 19 I.L.M. 1942 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Rome Convention]. It
 is unclear if the application of Member State law based on the Distance Selling Directive
 would constitute not providing "substantially similar protections and rights" to the merchant
 under UCITA § 109(c), and thus permit a US. court to apply U.S. law instead of the law of
 a Member State to a transaction involving a consumer in Europe.
 120. UCITA § 1 10 provides "[t]he parties in their agreement may choose an exclusive
 judicial forum unless the choice is unreasonable and unjust [and that a] choice-of-forum term
 is not exclusive unless the agreement expressly so provides." UCITA, supra note 36, S 1 10.
 121. 499 U.S. 585 (1991). In one case involving an arbitration clause in a Gateway com-
 puter form contract, the court upheld the provision. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d
 1 147, 1 150 (7th Cir. 1997). In another, the arbitration clause was held to be unconscionable.
 Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569, 575 (1998).
 122. See infra text accompanying notes 179-94.
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 UCITA contains several provisions that its proponents hail as important
 new consumer protections. The concept of "mass market" covers both
 consumer transactions and other transactions involving software or com-
 puter information offered to the general public under substantially iden-
 tical terms.123 Supporters of the software industry were critical of using
 the concept of "mass market" to define the scope of what would otherwise
 be protections limited to consumers because of the increased burdens this
 would impose on software developers licensing their products to business
 users.124 Consumer representatives were uncomfortable with the substi-
 tution of the concept of mass market for consumer, in what would oth-
 erwise have been consumer protection provisions, due to concerns that the
 result would be to reduce the substance of the statutory protections pro-
 vided to less sophisticated parties or parties with grossly unequal bargain-
 ing power to offset its wider coverage.125 Although the notion of mass
 market was never removed from the text of UCITA, the drafting com-
 mittee's enthusiasm for it waned as the drafting process continued, and
 some protections in the final draft that might have applied to mass market
 transactions apply only to consumers instead.126
 The general rule governing when a party will be deemed to have
 adopted specific terms of a contract is contained in section 29 of UCITA.
 The general rule states that if a party agrees to a record containing a term,
 by manifesting assent or otherwise, the party has adopted all the terms in
 the record, without regard to whether the party actually knew of or un-
 derstood those terms, and without regard to whether the terms were only
 made available to the party after performance or use began under the
 agreement.127 This rule formalizes a concept described in the reporter's
 123. UCITA § 102(a)(46) defines a "mass-market transaction" as:
 (A) a consumer contract; or (B) any other transaction with an end-user licensee if: (i) the
 transaction is for information or informational rights directed to the general public as
 a whole including consumers, under substantially the same terms for the same infor-
 mation; (ii) the licensee acquires the information or rights in a retail transaction under
 terms and in a quantity consistent with an ordinary transaction in a retail market; and
 (iii) the transaction is not: (I) a contract for redistribution or for public performance or
 public display of a copyrighted work; (II) a transaction in which the information is
 customized or otherwise specially prepared by the licensor for the licensee other than
 minor customization using a capability of the information intended for that purpose;
 (III) a site license; or (IV) an access contract.
 UCITA, suara note 36, § 102(aV46).
 124. See, e.g., Carol Kunze, Hot Button Issue: Mass Market Licenses (Mar. 13, 1999), in
 <http://www.2bguide.com/hbimmvc.html>.
 125. See, e.g., Memorandum from Gail Hillebrand, Consumers Union, to Uniform Law
 Commissioners (July 1997), in <http://www.2bguide.com/docs/cun.html>.
 126. See, e.g., UCITA, supra note 36, § 216 (governing consumer defenses to electronic
 errors that occur in automated transactions when no reasonable method to detect and correct
 the error has been provided).
 127. Id. §209.
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 notes as "layered contracting."128 The application of this general rule is
 modified slightly for mass market contracts by providing that a party will
 be deemed to have adopted a term in a mass market license only if the
 term was made available before performance or use began, or during the
 initial use or performance, and providing that the term is not unconscion-
 able or in conflict with terms to which the parties expressly agreed.129 In
 addition, if a party does not have an opportunity to review the terms of
 a mass market license before becoming obligated to pay and the party
 decides to decline the license after having actually reviewed the terms, the
 declining party is entitled to return whatever was provided and to be re-
 imbursed for any reasonable expenses incurred in the return, including
 any expenses incurred in uninstalling software from the declining party's
 computer and returning it to its original condition.130 The declining
 party's right to be reimbursed any expenses incurred in making the return
 is supposed to create market incentives for licensors to make the terms of
 mass-market licenses available before delivery.131 In general, consumer ad-
 vocates have found the benefits provided by these sections to be out-
 weighed by the harm caused by codifying recent case law in this area,
 which has frequently been unfavorable to consumers.132
 U.S. FEDERAL INITIATIVES
 Federal legislators have been considering whether uniform federal law
 in this area might be warranted, given that Congress can often act more
 quickly than the states acting through the ULC, and with greater certainty
 as to the uniformity of the final outcome.133 The variations among differ-
 ent state approaches to enabling the use of new electronic communications
 media are very substantial in number, even if they are ultimately found to
 be relatively limited in scope, or not to be very different in substance or
 application. Furthermore, a clear, consistent approach articulated by the
 federal government would permit the United States to speak with a single
 128. UCITA Draft Comments, supra note 72, § 208 n.3 (citing case law support for the
 concept of rolling or layering contract processes: ProCD, Inc. v. £eidenberg, 86 Ε 3d 1447 (7th
 Cir. 1996) (stating that shrinkwrap terms were part of contract); Brower v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
 676 N.YS.2d 569 (1998)).
 129. UCITA, supra note 36, § 210(a).
 130. Id. §210(b).
 131. UCITA Draft Comments, supra note 72, § 210 n.4(c); see abo UCITA, supra note 36,
 §210(b).
 1 32. See, e.g., Letter from Professor Jean Braucher and Professor Mark Budnitz, Co-Chairs
 of the Working Group on Consumer Protection, American Bar Association Business
 Law Section, Cyberspace Law Committee, to NCCUSL (June 10, 1999), in <http://
 www.2bguide.com/docs/jbmb699.html>.
 133. Philip S. Corwin, Electronic Authentication: The Emerging Federal Role, 38 JURIMETRICS
 261,262(1998).
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 voice in its dealings with the EU. Such a unified position may be necessary
 to reduce the possibility that the EU approach to electronic contracting
 law would become the de facto global standard by virtue of its more uniform
 application over a unified economy that is now larger than the U.S. econ-
 omy, which might harm the competitive position of U.S. firms offering
 electronic commerce products and services that do not comply with the
 EU standard.
 Although federal reform of contract law to support electronic commerce
 may seem like a much simpler, more direct solution to the problems that
 the ULC and individual state legislatures have been grappling with for
 some time, it may also cause problems that could be avoided by reforming
 contract law through the uniform law process or individual state legisla-
 tion. A great deal of contract law is still substantially defined by state law,
 whether in the form of state statutes such as the U.C.C. or in case law
 clarified by the first and second Restatements of Contracts. Federal interven-
 tion to minimize state law writing and signature requirements may have
 major, unintended consequences in many bodies of law beyond what is
 normally thought of as "contract law," including such bodies of law as
 negotiable instruments law, trusts and estate law, real property law and
 consumer protection law.134
 105TH CONGRESS
 In the 105th congressional session, many bills were introduced dealing
 with electronic commerce issues, but the only significant bill to become
 law was the Government Paperwork Elimination Act,135 which permits
 the federal government to accept digital signatures.136 Among the bills that
 were not enacted were special interest legislation permitting regulated
 financial institutions to become major providers of online authentication
 services.137 This bill included provisions that would establish a self-
 regulatory organization (SRO) to oversee providers of such services, simi-
 lar to the role played by SROs such as the National Association of Se-
 curities Dealers in other financial services industries.
 134. See, e.g., New Jersey Law Revision Commission, New Jersey Law Revision Commission
 Opposes Federal Ce-Commerce' Preemption Bills H.R. 1714 and S. 761, in <http://www.lawrev.
 state.nj .us/siç /fedbills.htm> .
 135. It was enacted as part of the Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277,
 112 Stat. 2681-2749 (codified as amended at 44 U.S.C. ch. 35).
 136. Proposed guidelines for the implementation of the Government Paperwork Elimi-
 nation Act were published on March 5, 1999. See Management of Federal Information
 Resources, 64 Fed. Reg. 10,896 (Mar. 5, 1999). The comment period on the proposed guide-
 lines closed on July 5, 1999.
 137. Digital Signature and Electronic Authentication Law of 1998, S. 1594, 105th Cong.
 (1998).
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 106TH CONGRESS
 In 1999, two important bills that would apply to electronic commerce
 were introduced in Congress. House Bill 1714, the "Electronic Signatures
 in Global and National Commerce Act,"138 and Senate Bill 761, the
 "Third Millennium Electronic Commerce Act."139 Both seek to create a
 level national playing field for electronic commerce by preempting out-
 dated state laws requiring manual signatures and paper writings, and elim-
 inating the bewildering array of different approaches taken by recent states
 to promote electronic commerce. Both congressional bills 1714 and 761
 show the influence of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Com-
 merce140 and the UETA; however, both bills have been criticized by the
 ULC141 and the U.S. Department of Commerce142 as more radical than
 the UETA and as unworkable within a federal legal system. In light of
 the controversy surrounding the proposed federal legislation in 1 999, it is
 unclear whether either bill is likely to be enacted in its current form.
 The scope of both bills is wider than the UETA because they apply to
 commercial transactions affecting interstate commerce, and have much
 more limited exclusions.143 Before enacting the UETA, state legislatures
 are encouraged to review various bodies of existing law to determine if
 the list of exemptions provided in the UETA is appropriate, or should be
 supplemented. Because these federal bills would preempt all state law in
 this area, there would be no such mechanism for fine-tuning the scope of
 the law at the state level. For example, the UETA excludes the U.C.C.
 from its scope in order to avoid disturbing conflating electronic funds trans-
 fers from negotiable instruments, or writing requirements that were written
 into statutes notwithstanding the availability of electronic alternatives.144
 138. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, H.R. 1714, 106th
 Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Electronic Signatures Act].
 139. Third Millennium Electronic Commerce Act, S. 761, 106th Cong. (1999) [herein-
 after Third Millennium Act] .
 140. See infra text accompanying notes 210-24.
 141. See Letter from John McCabe, Legal Counsel, NCCUSL, to Interested Parties (July
 6, 1999), in <http://www.webcom.com/legaled/ETAForum/docs/7699jm.html>; Letter
 from John McCabe, Legal Counsel, NCCUSL, to Members of the Commerce Committee,
 Congress of the United States (June 17, 1999), in <http://www.webcom.com/legaled/
 ETAForum/docs/ 1 7 1 4jm.html>.
 142. Letter from Andrew J. Pincus, Department of Commerce, to Representative Tom
 Bliley, Chairman, Committee on Commerce (Aug. 4, 1999), in <http://www.civics.com/
 content/fedleg/doc-l 7 14-opposed.htm>.
 143. While House Bill 1714 excludes wills, codicils, trusts, adoption, divorce, and family
 law matters, Senate Bill 761 excludes government transactions. Electronic Signatures Act,
 supra note 138, § 103; Third Millennium Act, supra note 139, § 4(8) (defining "[transaction"
 as "an action . . . between 2 or more persons" (emphasis added)). Neither statute has an
 exception for land transactions.
 144. UETA, supra note 24, § 3. See, e.g, U.C.C. Article 4A (1995) (regulating electronic
 funds transfers). U.C.C. § 4A-202(c)(ii) provides that a bank's customer may be liable for an
 unauthorized funds transfer if "the customer expressly agreed in wnting to be bound by any
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 Both bills would create pressure on state legislatures to adopt the UETA
 in order to avoid this kind of radical preemption of signature and writing
 requirements across a state's existing laws.145
 In addition, the proposed federal legislation does not exclude consumer
 transactions, and may have very serious negative consequences for con-
 sumers using electronic contracting technologies unless special provisions
 applicable to consumer transactions are added. The federal bills defer to
 party autonomy in very general terms,146 with no specific qualifications to
 deal with situations where the parties have grossly disparate bargaining
 power. 147 This problem has been addressed in UETA and in EU legislation
 by providing certain minimum procedural safeguards for consumers in
 electronic contracting situations that prevent, for example, a merchant
 using a pre-printed standard form paper contract to secure a consumer's
 agreement to receive future notices electronically.148
 payment order, whether or not authorized, issued in its name and accepted by the bank in
 compliance with the security procedure chosen by the customer." Id. § 4A-202(c)(ii) (emphasis
 added).
 145. Electronic Signatures Act, supra note 138, § 102; Third Millennium Act, supra note
 139, § 6. While it may be helpful to apply this kind of pressure to some states that may not
 have yet focused, mandating a very general enabling statute in the form of the UETA may
 not represent progress in all contexts. For example, in 1 998, the New Jersey Law Revision
 Commission completed an intensive multi-year study of how to revise its laws to eliminate
 obstacles to electronic commerce. The commission came to the conclusion that the unin-
 tended consequences of a general overlay statute in the form of the UETA might offset the
 intended benefits, and proposed instead several minor changes in specific laws. See New Jersey
 Law Revision Commission, Final Report Relating to Electronic Records and Signatures (Oct. 1998),
 in <http: / / www.lawrev.state.nj .us/sig/frpt.pdf> .
 146. House Bill 1714 provides that "jw]ith respect to any contract or agreement entered
 into in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, the parties to such contract or agreement
 may establish reasonable requirements regarding the types of electronic records and elec-
 tronic signatures acceptable to such parties." Electronic Signatures Act, supra note 138,
 § 101(b). Senate Bill 761 provides that "[t]he parties to a contract may agree on the terms
 and conditions on which they will use and accept electronic signatures and electronic records,
 including the methods therefore, in commercial transactions affecting interstate commerce.
 Nothing in this subsection requires that any party enter into such a contract." Third Millen-
 nium Act, supra note 139, § 6(b).
 147. The same issue is raised with the very general language affirming the principle of
 freedom of contract in UCITA. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
 148. For example, the federal bills have no provisions that correspond to a provision in
 UETA providing that even between parties who have agreed to communicate electronically,
 a legal requirement that information be provided in writing is only met if the information
 is provided in a format that the recipient can retain. UETA, supra note 24, § 8(a); see supra
 text accompanying notes 55-68. In the EU Distance Selling Directive, the merchant must
 provide certain information to consumers regarding contracts executed online in writing or
 another durable medium available and accessible to the consumer. Distance Selling Direc-
 tive, supra note 91, art. 5; see infra text accompanying notes 195-206.
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 EU INITIATIVES
 In 1997, the Commission announced its intention to create a coherent
 legal framework within Europe for electronic commerce by the year
 2000. 149 As a result, various proposals to regulate different aspects of elec-
 tronic contracting are currently pending in the EU. Even the most market-
 oriented of the proposals, the draft directive governing electronic com-
 merce (draft EC Directive)150 is more comprehensive, more regulatory, and
 more protective of consumers than any legislation currently pending in
 the United States. The draft electronic signature directive (draft ES Di-
 rective)151 is a highly technical statute aimed at regulating only selected
 aspects of electronic commerce and is not intended to amend national
 laws governing contract formation.152 Proposals to modify the 1968 Brus-
 sels Convention and the 1980 Rome Convention, which today govern the
 enforceability of contractual choice of law provisions, with a new Brussels
 Regulation and a new Rome Regulation would make the law of a con-
 sumer's jurisdiction the applicable law for electronic commerce transac-
 tions, and would make the consumer's home state the appropriate forum
 as well. The proposed Brussels Regulation could effectively nullify the
 effort in the draft EC Directive to guarantee that application of the coun-
 try of origin and mutual recognition principles apply to the regulation of
 electronic commerce in Europe. The draft EC Directive would permit EU
 merchants engaged in electronic contracting within the EU to comply only
 with the applicable law of their home country, eliminating the need for
 such merchants to comply with the law of each Member State individually.
 This possible erosion of one of the fundamental premises of the EU Single
 149. See Electronic Commerce: Commission Presents Framework for Future Action (visited Sept. 17,
 1999), in <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/infso/313.htm>.
 150. In November 1998, the Commission adopted the Proposal for a European Parlia-
 ment and Council Directive on Certain Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce in the In-
 ternal Market, COM(98)586 final [hereinafter Draft EC Directive]. On September 1, 1999,
 in response to comments from the Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee,
 the Commission issued an Amended Proposal for a European Parliament and Council
 Directive on Certain Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce in the Internal Market,
 COM(1 999)427 final, available in <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/
 eleccomm/com427en.pdf>.
 151. Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on a Common Frame-
 work for Electronic Signatures, COM(98)297 final, available in <http://www.ispo.cec.be/eif/
 policy/com98297.html> [hereinafter 1998 Draft ES Directive]. On April 29, 1999, in re-
 sponse to comments from the Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee, and the
 Committee of the Regions, the Commission issued an Amended Proposal for a European
 Parliament and Council Directive on a Common Framework for Electronic Signatures,
 COM(99)195 final, available in <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/sign/
 signamen.pdf>.
 152. Political Agreement on a Common Position of the Council on a Framework for
 Electronic Signatures (Apr. 22, 1999), in <http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/dgl5/en/
 media/sign/composen.htm> [hereinafter Political Agreement].
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 Market is all the more surprising in light of the recent enactment of a
 Distance Selling Directive,153 which requires each Member State to revise
 its consumer protection law to provide special new protections to consum-
 ers making purchases online or by telephone.
 PROPOSED ELECTRONIC COMMERCE DIRECTIVE
 In November 1998, the Commission proposed a draft directive designed
 to create a legal framework for electronic commerce within the European
 Union in order to facilitate cross border electronic commerce transactions.
 The draft EC Directive incorporates the fundamental principles of the
 internal market, country of origin, and mutual recognition, as reaffirmed
 by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in a number of cases involving
 the free movement of goods and services, beginning with the landmark
 Cassis de Dijon case.154 The Commission is seeking to ensure that existing
 EU and national legislation is effectively enforced. The draft EC Directive
 would accomplish this through application of the principle of mutual rec-
 ognition155 and the development of codes of conduct at the EU level.156
 Furthermore, it aims to increase cross border cooperation between na-
 tional regulatory authorities in the Member States and by setting up of
 an effective cross-border dispute resolution system.157 The draft EC Di-
 rective, however, would not override the 1980 Rome Convention on Ap-
 plicable Law for Contractual Obligations or the 1968 Brussels Convention
 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgements.158 These conventions,
 together with the new Brussels Regulation and the proposed Rome Regu-
 lation, have the effect of undermining the country of origin and mutual
 recognition principles.
 The draft EC Directive would govern much more than electronic con-
 tracting if it is enacted. It would regulate the establishment of electronic
 commerce Internet service providers (ISPs),159 electronic commercial com-
 153. Distance Selling Directive, supra note 91. In addition, the Commission has proposed
 a directive that would cover distance selling of financial services. See Proposal Concerning
 Distance Marketing, supra note 91. This proposal was amended on July 26, 1999.
 154. Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein,
 1979 E.C.R. 649, [1978-79 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 18543 (Feb. 20,
 1979).
 155. Draft EC Directive, supra note 150, art. 3.
 156. Id. art. 16.
 157. /</. arts. 17-19.
 158. Id. art. 1.
 159. Id. arts. 4-5. The draft EC Directive would not only clarify the law, but would also
 make the operation of electronic marketplaces more transparent to prospective customers
 by requiring merchants doing business online to reveal the merchant's identity, physical lo-
 cation, email address, VAT number, and, where applicable, registration in a trade register
 and license to engage in a regulated trade. Id. art. 5
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 munications,160 and the liability of intermediaries.161 The draft EC Di-
 rective also attempts to reduce the current legal uncertainty surrounding
 the issue of establishment by providing a definition of the state of estab-
 lishment in line with principles established by the EU Treaty and the case
 law of theECJ.162
 One important principle that the draft EC Directive would establish is
 that Member States may not impose any requirement of prior authori-
 zation on Internet electronic commerce activities.163 The purpose of this
 Article is to reinforce the principle of freedom to provide services by fa-
 cilitating access to the supply of services on the Internet. It constitutes a
 "right to a site," which can be exercised by any natural or legal person
 wishing to provide electronic commerce services over the Internet. This
 provision prevents Member States from maintaining and introducing any
 legislation requiring prior authorization or licensing before Internet sites
 can be set up for electronic commerce services. It does not override existing
 requirements for professional qualifications or authorizations by a profes-
 sional body for the provision of services, however, which are not exclusively
 aimed at electronic commerce services.164
 Article 5 sets out the minimum information (e.g., the name, place of
 establishment and e-mail address, and VAT registration) which the ISP
 must give to consumers.165 It supplements the information requirements
 that exist in the distance selling directive on the protection of consumers
 in relation to distance contracts. It also extends the provisions of the dis-
 tance selling directive by obligating the ISP to provide the information,
 even where no contract is to be formed. The information in question must
 be easily accessible from the service being provided, for example, by click-
 ing on an icon or a logo with hypertext link to the page containing the
 information which should be visible on all the pages of the web site. Prices,
 indicated in Euros, will meet the price information requirement laid down
 in this Article.
 160. Id. arts. 6-7.
 161. Id. arts. 12-15. These articles provide an exemption from liability for ISPs if they act
 as mere conduits for the transmission of information, authorize temporary storage of infor-
 mation through systems "caching" limits the liability of the ISP for content posted by others
 if the ISP is not aware of the illegal activity, and states that ISPs are under no general
 obligation to monitor third party content placed on their sites. Id.
 162. The right of establishment is the right to set up agencies, branches, or subsidiaries
 by nationals of any Member State in the territory of any other Member State and is guar-
 anteed by Article 43 of the Treaty establishing the European Community as amended by
 the Treaty of Amsterdam. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
 art. 43 (ex. art. 52), available in 1 EUROPEAN UNION Law Guide (Phillip Raworth ed., 1999).
 See, e.g., Case 2/74, Reyners v. Belgian State, 2 C.M.L.R. 305 (1974).
 163. Draft EC Directive, supra note 150, art. 4, f 1.
 164. Id. art 4, f 2.
 165. Id. art 5.
This content downloaded from 205.175.118.27 on Mon, 08 Jan 2018 18:37:05 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 484 The Business Lawyer; Vol. 55, November 1999
 The Commission believes that commercial communications, for in-
 stance advertising, sponsorship, direct marketing, and promotions, are a
 fundamental part of the majority of electronic commerce services.166
 Therefore, the draft EC Directive defines what constitutes "commercial
 communications"167 and makes such communications subject to certain
 rules regarding transparency in order to ensure consumer confidence and
 fair trading. It establishes the principle that commercial communications
 must be clearly identifiable as such by consumers; for example, commercial
 communications should not be hidden in the form of an advertisement.
 The person on whose behalf the commercial communication is carried
 out must also be clearly identified.168 For example, the banner could carry
 the company's name, icon, or logo with a hypertext link to the page con-
 taining this information. This link should be visible on all the pages of the
 site. In an effort to suppress "spamming," the draft EC Directive requires
 electronic commerce businesses to ensure that commercial communica-
 tions by e-mail are clearly identifiable in order to prevent harmful intrusion
 into consumer privacy.169 The draft EC Directive also states that regulated
 professions (e.g., lawyers and accountants) should be permitted to use com-
 mercial communications provided they comply with the professional codes
 of conduct drawn up by national professional associations.170
 The draft EC Directive states that Member States should amend their
 laws to ensure that contracts concluded electronically are genuinely and
 effectively workable in law and in practice.171 Member States will be re-
 quired to repeal provisions that prohibit or restrict the use of electronic
 media for contracting, and refrain from preventing the use of certain elec-
 tronic systems such as intelligent electronic agents for contracting.172 They
 must also refrain from creating a two-tier system which gives electronic
 contracts less legal effect than paper contracts, and repeal formal contrac-
 tual requirements which cannot be met by electronic means or create
 ambiguities when applied to electronic contracts.173 Merchants wishing to
 enter into contracts online must explain clearly and unequivocally prior
 to the formation of the contract what steps will be involved in concluding
 the contract, whether the contract will be accessible after it is effective and
 what procedures will be used for handling errors. Member States must
 take steps to ensure that electronic contracts are only formed after the
 166. /</. pmbl.,1[lO.
 167. Id. art. 2(e).
 168. Id. art. 6(b).
 169. Id. art. 7.
 170. Id. art. 8.
 171. /</.pmbl.,f 13.
 172. Id. art. 9. Exceptions are made for contracts that require "the involvement of a
 notary," which must be "registered with a public authority" in order to be valid, which are
 "governed by family law," or "the law of succession." Id.
 173. Id.
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 parties have given their full and informed consent to the contract.174 In
 addition, the draft EC Directive clarifies the moment of the conclusion of
 a contract in certain cases, and requires that end-users of online contract-
 ing services must be provided with effective means of identifying and cor-
 recting errors and accidental transactions.175
 PROPOSED ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE DIRECTIVE
 In May 1998, the Commission proposed an electronic signature direc-
 tive to regulate the use of electronic signature technologies in Europe. The
 draft ES Directive was aimed at harmonizing the various approaches being
 taken by Member States to regulate electronic signature technologies. In
 1998, the Commission found that several Member States had already
 started detailed legislative initiatives related to electronic signatures, and
 that the actual use of this technology might be hindered by the existence
 of multiple, inconsistent regulatory regimes within Europe.176 The draft
 ES Directive is not intended to "apply to electronic signatures exclusively
 within closed systems," such as those maintained by a corporation for its
 own internal network.177
 The draft ES Directive would establish a legal framework for certain
 certification services provided to the public.178 It sets up common require-
 ments for certification service providers (CSPs) to ensure cross-border rec-
 ognition of signatures and certificates within the EU. It further attempts
 to maintain a technology-neutral perspective and does not mandate the
 use of any particular electronic signature technology. On the one hand,
 the draft ES Directive provides that CSPs should be able to enter the
 market for certification services without prior authorization to ensure that
 markets for these services develop freely. On the other hand, the Member
 States are authorized to establish voluntary accreditation schemes to pro-
 mote the availability of responsible services to the public. In order to
 promote public confidence in these technologies, the draft ES Directive
 provides that CSPs shall be liable for the validity of the contents of cer-
 tificates they issue.
 1 74. Id. art. 10. This approach is in marked contrast with the more sweeping affirmations
 of the principles of party autonomy and freedom of contract contained in proposed U.S.
 federal legislation and UCITA. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77, 146.
 175. Id. art 1 1. This article provides that if a contract is formed by an end-user giving
 assent to an offer through a technological means, such as clicking on an icon, the contract
 is concluded when the end-user receives an acknowledgment of receipt of that manifestation
 of assent from the other party.
 1 76. Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on a Common Frame-
 work for Electronic Signatures, COM(98)297 final, in <http://www/europa.eu.int/comm/
 dgl5/en/media/infso/com297en.pdf>.
 177. Political Agreement, supra note 152.
 178. 1998 Draft ES Directive, supra note 151.
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 PROPOSED BRUSSELS AND ROME REGULATIONS
 The EU first addressed the choice of law problem in international con-
 sumer contracts with the 1980 Rome Convention.179 Under Article 3 of
 the Rome Convention, the parties to a contract are free to select the
 governing law; however, Article 5 provides that a choice of law provision
 in a consumer contract may not deprive the consumer of the benefit of
 mandatory consumer protection laws in effect in the consumer's country
 of habitual residence.180 Such mandatory consumer protection laws in-
 clude those prohibiting unfair contract terms, limiting the enforceability
 of standard for contracts, creating rights of cancellation during a "cooling
 off" period following the formation of the contract, or requiring that
 certain disclosures be made by the seller.181 These choice of law provisions
 have a dispute resolution counterpart in the 1968 Brussels Convention,
 which governs questions of judicial jurisdiction among various European
 countries. Article 13 of the Brussels Convention provides that while a
 consumer has the option to bring suit against a business in either the
 consumer's or the business' home country, the business may only bring
 suit against the consumer in the consumer's country.
 In July 1999, the Commission adopted a draft Regulation on Jurisdic-
 tion and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters.182
 When adopted by the Council of Ministers, this regulation will replace
 and update the 1968 Brussels Convention in order to take account of new
 forms of commerce that did not exist in 1968.183 Article 15 of the draft
 Brussels Regulation provides that the courts of a consumer's country of
 habitual residence have jurisdiction over suppliers of goods and services
 located in other Member States of the EU.184 Recital 13 of the proposed
 Brussels Regulation makes clear that any EU merchant who operates an
 electronic commerce web site that can be accessed by a consumer will be
 at risk of being haled into court in the country of the consumer's habitual
 1 79. 1980 Rome Convention, supra note 119; see Matthew S. Yeo & Marco Berlin, Conflict
 Looms Over Choice of Law in Internet Transactions, 4 Elec. Com. & L. Rep. (BNA) 85, 86
 (Jan. 27, 1999).
 180. 1980 Rome Convention, supra note 1 19, art 3.
 181. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Com-
 mercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, OJ. C027 of 26/01/98 (498Y0 1.26(01)) [hereinafter 1968
 Brussels Convention]. The Convention applies to all EU Member States and, by the 1988
 Lugano Convention, to the members of the European Free Trade Association.
 1 82. Proposal for a Council Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments
 in Civil and Commercial Matters, July 14, 1999, COM(99)348 final [hereinafter Proposed
 Brussels Regulation].
 183. Id. The entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty on May 1, 1999, obviates the need
 to have this regulation enacted as a convention agreed to by signatory nations. The subject
 matter of the convention is now within the competence of the Commission to address by
 regulations prepared for adoption by the Council of Ministers.
 184. Id. art. 15.
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 residence in the event of litigation with the consumer.185 This would be
 true even if the merchant operating the electronic commerce web site had
 not taken any steps beyond posting its home page on the Internet and had
 taken no more active steps to target consumers located outside the Mem-
 ber State where the merchant's business was established. This is a stricter
 standard than the one contained in Article 13 of the Brussels Convention,
 which provides that a merchant is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts
 of the consumer's country only if the conclusion of the contract was
 preceded by a specific invitation addressed to the consumer or by pur-
 chasing advertising targeted at the country of the consumer's habitual
 residence, and the consumer took the steps necessary to conclude the con-
 tract from within the consumer's own country.186
 The Schlosser Report187 (one of the two official reports on the Brussels
 Convention) states that the appropriate jurisdiction is the country where
 the consumer resides if the trader has taken steps to market his goods and
 services there.188 Such steps cover, inter alia, mail order and doorstep selling.
 The trader must have taken action aimed specifically at that country, such
 as advertising in the press, on the radio or television, in the cinema, or by
 mailing catalogues, or he must have made a business proposal individually
 through an intermediary or representative, or by canvassing to qualify.
 The Schlosser Report expressly refers to the Report on the Obligations
 Convention, which gives the following example: If a German makes a
 contract in response to an advertisement published by a French company
 in a German publication, the contract will be covered by the special
 rules.189 If, on the other hand, the German replies to advertisements in
 U.S. publications, even if they are sold in Germany, the rule does not apply
 unless the advertisements appeared in special editions of the publication
 185. Id. pmbl.51[ 13.
 186. 1968 Brussels Convention, supra note 181, art. 13.
 187. Peter Schlosser, Report to the Convention on the Association of the Kingdom of
 Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the
 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial
 Matters and the Protocol on its Interpretation by the Court of Justice, Oct. 9, 1978, app. 1
 (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of Law) [hereinafter Schlos-
 ser Report] .
 188. Id. If 158.
 189. Professors Giuliano & Lagarde, Report on the Obligations Convention, OJ. 1980
 C282/4, quoted in STEPHEN O'MALLEY & ALEXANDER LaYTON, EUROPEAN ClVIL PRAC-
 TICE 504 n.58 (1989) [hereinafter Report on the Obligations Convention]. " '[S]pecial rules'
 of jurisdiction" is defined as "directly designating the competent court without referring to
 the rules of jurisdiction in force in the State where such a court might be situated . ..." Id.
 For special rules to apply, there "must be a close connecting factor between the dispute and
 the court with jurisdiction to resolve it." See P. Jenard, Report on the Convention on Juris-
 diction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968,
 app. 1, § 2, arts. 5, 6 (on file with The Business Lawyer, University of Maryland School of
 Law).
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 intended for European countries.190 The Schlosser Report also argues that
 consumer contracts, other than those where the trader has taken steps to
 target the consumer in some way, should be subject to the special provi-
 sions only if there is a sufficiently strong connection with the place where
 the consumer is domiciled.191 It is clear from the above comparison of the
 provisions of Article 1 3 of the existing Brussels Convention and Article
 1 5 of the proposed Brussels Regulation that much stricter rules are being
 imposed on electronic commerce transactions than were originally man-
 dated for more traditional cross-border transactions.
 The approach taken in the proposed Brussels Regulation is clearly at
 odds with the approach taken in the draft EC Directive. The proposed
 Brussels Regulation seems to indicate a lack of appreciation on the part
 of its drafters of the differences between establishing a passive Internet
 web site that may be accessed by individuals anywhere in the world, and
 a trader either purchasing advertising targeted at a consumer in the con-
 sumer's home or using the mail to solicit a consumer.192 Such efforts to
 preserve the rights of consumers shift the cost of litigating in a remote
 jurisdiction from the consumer to the merchant. While multinational cor-
 porations may be prepared to live with this risk, it may have a chilling
 effect on small and medium-sized enterprises considering the use of the
 Internet for marketing and contracting. The proposed Brussels Regula-
 tion's focus on preserving the consumer's right to litigate under the con-
 sumer's law and in the consumer's own courts does not seem to take into
 account the efforts underway to harmonize Member State consumer pro-
 tection law through legislation based on the requirements of the Distance
 Selling Directive, and the alternative dispute resolution provisions of the
 draft EC Directive, which might reduce the expense of resolving disputes
 for both merchants and consumers.
 The proposed Rome Regulation deals with non-contractual liability.
 Currently a Council Working Party, composed of experts from the Mem-
 ber States is discussing the Austrian President's proposal for the Rome
 Regulation. Of particular significance to electronic commerce is Article 6
 of the Austrian Presidency's draft which deals with the applicable law in
 respect of unfair competition and unfair practices. This Article states that
 the law applicable to obligations arising from unfair competition or unfair
 practices shall be the law of the country where the competitive action or
 unfair practice affects competitive relations or collective consumer interest.
 If the provisions of Article 6 are adopted in their current form, it would
 mean that a United Kingdom (U.K.) company using the Internet to trade
 on a pan-European basis would not be able to take advantage of the
 principles of home country control and mutual recognition in the event a
 190. Report on the Obligations Convention, supra note 189.
 191. Id.^ 159.
 192. See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text.
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 claim for unfair competition or trade practices were made against the
 company. This could also be a significant factor undermining the willing-
 ness of small and medium-sized enterprises to undertake electronic com-
 merce activities, because substantial variations remain in the competition
 and unfair trade practices laws of different Member States. For example,
 if a U.K. merchant were to use its Internet site to offer promotions or
 discounts on consumer purchases or the use of certain types of marketing
 techniques (for example, buy a packet of cornflakes and get the oppor-
 tunity to win a holiday or purchase two pairs of shoes and get a third pair
 free), which are perfectly legal under English law, the provisions of Article
 6 would mean that the trader could fall foul of the unfair competition laws
 of other Member States (for example, Germany) where such trading prac-
 tices are illegal. While the costs of assuring that web site content conforms
 to the different competition and unfair trade practices laws of each Mem-
 ber State may not be prohibitive for multinational corporations, they might
 well be prohibitive for small and medium-sized enterprises. The proposed
 Rome Regulation is thus inconsistent with other actions being taken by
 the Commission, such as its stated commitment in the explanatory mem-
 orandum of the draft EC Directive to promoting electronic commerce
 among small and medium-sized enterprises,193 and providing a high level
 of consumer protection in electronic commerce transactions through a
 variety of strategies in addition to reliance of special jurisdictional rules.194
 DISTANCE SEIZING DIRECTIVE
 In 1997, the EU adopted a directive (the Distance Selling Directive) on
 the protection of consumers in respect to distance contracts.195 The Dis-
 tance Selling Directive is supposed to promote online commerce by pro-
 viding consumers with a guarantee that they will be protected by their
 own national consumer protection regime when they enter into distance
 selling contracts.196 Distance selling is defined as the conclusion of a con-
 193. Draft EC Directive, supra note 150, pmbl., f 2. It is ironic that on July 2, 1999, the
 Commission decided to bring proceedings against Germany in the ECJ in respect of its
 unfair competition law which severely regulates promotional offers, discounts and free gifts.
 1 94. Explanatory Memorandum for the Proposal for a European Parliament and Council
 Directive on Certain Legal Aspects of Electronic Commerce in the Internal Market (Nov.
 18, 1998), COM(98)586 final, in <http://www.europa.ev.int/comm/dgl5/en/media/elec-
 comm/com 586en.pdf>. The additional strategies include: lessening the risk of illegal activ-
 ities, imposing information and transparency obligations on merchants so consumers have
 the information they need to make informed choices, guaranteeing fair contracting and error
 correction procedures, and promoting codes of conduct and alternative dispute resolution
 processes.
 195. Distance Selling Directive, supra note 91. The Member States have until May 20,
 2000, to enact national laws embodying the terms of the Distance Selling Directive. Id.
 art. 15.
 196. Id. art. 12.
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 tract regarding goods or services whereby the contract between the con-
 sumer and the supplier takes place by means of technology for commu-
 nication at a distance.197 Consumers felt the need for special protections
 in this area because of the risks of invasions to individual privacy by
 aggressive marketing techniques, inadequate or improper information be-
 ing provided to the consumer by the supplier, and risks of fraud or error
 in card payment services used to make payments under distance selling
 contracts. In addition, the rights granted consumers through the enact-
 ment of the Distance Selling Directive's provisions into national law may
 not be waived by the consumer.198 The Distance Selling Directive contains
 an analog to the U.S. Federal Trade Commission's Mail Order Rule,199
 which requires that a transaction be completed within thirty days or notice
 must be sent to the consumer of the situation giving the consumer the
 option to cancel the transaction.200 The Distance Selling Directive covers
 most forms of direct marketing, including catalog mail order, telephone
 sales, direct response television sales, newspapers, magazines, and elec-
 tronic communications such as e-mail.201 The Distance Selling Directive
 requires that a consumer must be given certain minimum information,
 both at the time of contract solicitation and at or before the time of
 delivery.202 Written confirmation of information must be received by the
 consumer in some form of "durable medium" accessible to the con-
 sumer.203 Consumers must, subject to certain exceptions, also be given a
 "cooling off" period of at least seven working days.204 Where the con-
 sumer exercises his or her right of withdrawal from the contract, the sup-
 plier is obliged to reimburse the consumer for any sums paid. Cold-calling
 of consumers by telephone, fax, or e-mail is not permitted unless the
 consumer has consented.205
 In an effort to protect merchants from unreasonable burdens in con-
 sumer transactions, certain types of transactions are exempted from the
 coverage of certain Distance Selling Directive protections.206 For example,
 unless the parties have otherwise agreed, the consumer's seven-day right
 of withdrawal does not apply to contracts for the provision of services if
 performance has begun before the seven days are up; for the supply of
 goods or services the price of which is dependent on fluctuations in the
 financial market which cannot be controlled by the supplier; for the supply
 197. Id. art. 2, If 1.
 198. Id. art. 12.
 1 99. 1 5 U.S.C. S 45ίσ·ϊ Π 994V
 200. Distance Selling Directive, supra note 91, art. 7.
 201. Id. annex I.
 202. Id. art. 4.
 203. Id. art. 5.
 204. Id. art. 6.
 205. Id. art. 10.
 206. Id. art. 6, % 3.
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 of goods made to the consumer's specifications or clearly personalized, or
 which are likely to deteriorate or expire rapidly; for audio or video re-
 cordings or computer software, which were unsealed by the consumer; for
 the supply of newspapers, periodicals, or magazines; or for gaming or
 lottery services.
 UNCITRAL INITIATIVES
 UNCITRAL207 is an organization based in Vienna, Austria which de-
 velops model laws and standard documents meant to facilitate interna-
 tional commercial transactions. Among its undertakings, UNCITRAL has
 produced the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale
 of Goods, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Transfers,
 the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration,
 and the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules.208 The global scope of electronic
 commerce makes UNCITRAL an obvious and logical forum for devel-
 oping a consensus regarding what reforms in existing contract law are
 appropriate to facilitate the continued expansion of electronic contracting.
 The first UNCITRAL project to address electronic contracting directly
 was the Model Law on Electronic Commerce (Model Law), which took a
 rigorously media-neutral approach. The current UNCITRAL project ad-
 dressing electronic contracting is the Draft Uniform Rules on Electronic
 Signatures (Uniform Rules), which is more technical and regulatory in its
 approach.209
 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE MODEL LAW
 The Model Law was completed by UNCITRAL in June 1996,210 and
 was approved by the United Nations General Assembly in December
 207. UNCITRAL was created in 1966 by General Assembly Resolution 2205 (XXI), and
 is primarily charged with oversight of international commercial law. A list of its projects may
 be found at UNCITRAL <http://www.uncitral.org>.
 208. See Richard Hill & Ian Waiden, The Draft UNCITRAL Model Law for Electronic Commerce:
 Issues and Solutions, 13 COMPUTER Law. 18 (1996).
 209. A list of recent documents produced by UNCITRAL's WG-EC, includes progress
 reports on the Draft Uniform Rules on Electronic Signatures. See UNCITRAL (visited
 Oct. 10, 1999) <http://www.uncitral.org/english/sessions/wg_ec/index.htm>.
 210. UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment ( 1 996),
 UN. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1996, in <http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/electcom/in-
 dex.htm> [hereinafter Model Law]. The Model Law and its accompanying Guide to En-
 actment were also published in Uncitral Model Law: UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Com-
 merce, 7 Tul. J. Int'l & COMP. 1. 237 (1999). As adopted by the Commission in 1998, Article
 5 bis on incorporation by reference provides, "[information shall not be denied legal effect,
 validity or enforceability solely on the grounds that it is not contained in the data message
 purporting to give rise to such legal effect, but is merely referred to in that data message."
 Model Law, supra, art 5.
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 1996, by non-vote resolution.211 The Model Law has been enacted in
 Singapore and the Republic of Korea, and has influenced legislation in
 many jurisdictions, including the United States, the state of Illinois, and
 the UETA.212
 The Model Law applies only to data messages used in commercial trans-
 actions, and does not override consumer protection laws.213 Data message
 includes "information generated, sent, received or stored" in electronic
 form, including EDI messages, e-mail, or facsimiles.214 The heart of the
 Model Law is found in Article 5, which provides that "information shall
 not be denied legal effect, validity or enforceability solely on the grounds
 that it is [in the form of a data message]."215 A data message may meet
 a legal requirement of a writing provided that the data message is in a
 format that may be accessed for subsequent reference.216 A data message
 meets a legal requirement of a signature if a method is used to identify a
 person and indicates the person's approval of the contents of the message,
 and that method is as reliable as is appropriate under the circumstances.217
 A data message may also meet a legal requirement that an original doc-
 ument be "presented or retained."218 Data messages shall not be excluded
 from evidence in a legal proceeding solely on the grounds that it is elec-
 tronic or "it is not in its original form."219 Record retention requirements
 may be met by retention of data messages provided that the information
 they contain: may be accessed for subsequent reference, can be "demon-
 strated to represent accurately the information" that was stored, and if
 possible, the provenance of the data message can be demonstrated.220
 Attribution of a data message to its purported originator is permitted
 if the originator in fact sent it, if it was sent by someone who had authority
 to bind the originator, or if the originator is responsible for the program-
 ming that automatically originated the message.221 The Model Law goes
 on to provide that "an addressee is entitled to regard a data message as
 being that of the originator ... [i]f . . . the addressee properly applied a
 211. Richard Field, 1996: Survey of the Tear's Developments in Electronic Cash Law and the Laws
 Affecting Electronic Banking in the United States, 46 Am. U. L. Rev. 967, 974-75. (1997).
 212. UNCITRAL, Status of Conventions and Model Laws (Oct. 1, 1999), in <http://www.
 uncitral.org/english/status/status.pdf>; see Boss, Electronic Commerce, supra note 8 (discussing
 UNCITRAL's impact on UETA); Overby, supra note 8 (same).
 213. Model Law, supra note 210, art. 1.
 214. Id. art. 2(a).
 215. Id. art. 5 bis.
 216. Id. art. 6(1). This is similar to UETA, supra note 24, § 7 and UCITA, supra note 36,
 § 107(a). See also supra notes 50-54, 88-92 and accompanying text.
 217. Model Law, supra note 210, art. 7(1).
 218. Id. art. 8.
 219. Id. art. 9.
 220. Id. art. 10(1).
 221. Id. art. 13; see UETA, supra note 24, § 9.
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 procedure previously agreed to by the originator," or the message "resulted
 from the actions of a person" who was able to send the message because
 of its relationship with the originator.222 These additional provisions are
 derived from the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit Trans-
 fers, which in turn was drawn in substantial measure from the attribution
 procedures of U.C.C. Article 4A governing funds transfers.223 This type
 of provision was debated extensively during the drafting of the UETA,
 and ultimately not included in that statute in the interest of avoiding the
 substantive reform of contract and other bodies of law by importing stan-
 dards developed in the highly specialized context of high value electronic
 funds transfers.224
 ELECTRONIC SIGNATURE UNIFORM RULES
 In 1996, the WG-EC "was requested to examine the desirability and
 feasibility of preparing uniform rules on [digital signatures and CAs]."225
 It was agreed that these Uniform Rules should address such issues as: the
 legal basis supporting certification processes, including emerging digital
 authentication and certification technology; the applicability of the certi-
 fication process; the allocation of risk and liabilities of users, providers,
 and third parties using certification techniques; the specific issues of cer-
 tification through the use of registries; and incorporation by reference.
 Although the Uniform Rules are substantially focused on a single tech-
 nology, i.e., digital signatures deployed in a PKI, the Uniform Rules are
 supposed to be consistent with the media-neutral approach taken with the
 Model Law and are not supposed to favor one authentication technology
 at the expense of others. The WG-EC is supposed to limit the scope of
 its project in deference to the role of party autonomy in establishing mar-
 ket-based standards for electronic commerce, although it remains unclear
 if this will be achieved.
 By 1999, it appeared that the WG-EC might be unable to forge a con-
 sensus with regard to uniform rules to govern the use of electronic sig-
 natures.226 The work of the WG-EC was faulted for excessive emphasis
 on digital signatures, and not sufficiently recognizing the business need for
 222. Model Law, supra note 210, art. 13.
 223. Id. pt. II, art. 13, remarks U 83; UNCITRAL Model Law on International Credit
 Transfers, art. 5 (1992), available in <http://www.unctral.org/english/texts/payments/
 mlict.htm>; see U.C.C. §§ 4A-201 to -203 (1995).
 224. See, e.g., UETA, Reporter's Notes (Proposed Official Draft, Mar. 19, 1999) (regarding
 the deletion of former § 107), in <http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ulc/uecicta/
 eta399.htm>.
 225. UNCITAL Working Group on Electronic Commerce, Draft Uniform Rules on Elec-
 tronic Signatures, thirty-fifth session, UN. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.IV/WP.82 (June 26, 1999),
 in <http://www.uncitral.org/english/sessions/wg_ex/wp73.htm> [hereinafter Uniform
 Rules].
 226. Id. introduction ffl[ 6-7.
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 flexibility in adopting new authentication technologies. There was uncer-
 tainty whether any legislation beyond the Model Law would even be nec-
 essary to promote continued innovation in electronic commerce. Notwith-
 standing these reservations, however, the WG-EC's mandate to produce
 Uniform Rules was not withdrawn. This was due in part to the fact that
 so many national governments around the world were in the process of
 preparing legislation to deal with digital signatures and PKI issues such as
 the regulation of certificate authorities. It was felt that some guidance from
 UNCITRAL might help produce more appropriate legislation in this
 area.227
 In the June 1999 draft of the Uniform Rules, the basic approach taken
 was still quite technology specific, notwithstanding various efforts by the
 WG-EC to soften the effect of rules that tend to favor digital signature
 technologies and associate specific legal consequences with their use. On
 the one hand, the scope section had been rewritten to limit the application
 of the Uniform Rules to commercial transactions, and to expressly provide
 that they would not override any consumer protection law.228 On the other
 hand, the Uniform Rules still distinguish between electronic signatures,
 which is not a technology-specific term, and enhanced electronic signa-
 tures, which must meet a higher standard of reliability described in terms
 consistent with digital signature technology229 and associate the use of
 enhanced electronic signatures with specific legal consequences.230
 CONCLUSION
 In 1999, the message that every business needed an iCe-business" strat-
 egy was ubiquitous. As managers in businesses across the economy strug-
 gled to come to terms with the implications of electronic commerce for
 business operations, one issue among many that managers had to confront
 was the enforceability of contracts entered into using new communications
 media. Although the current version of the U.C.C. and the common law
 of contracts provide clear answers to a limited number of electronic con-
 tracting issues, the application of current law to many more issues pro-
 duces ambiguous or unfavorable results. While it is unlikely that any client
 wants to hear his or her attorney say, "That's an interesting question," in
 response to the client's query about the legal effect of some new e-business
 227. The next meeting of the WG-EG was scheduled for September 1999.
 228. Uniform Rules, supra note 225, art. 1.
 229. Id. art. 2.
 230. If an enhanced electronic signatures is used, it will be presumed to meet any legal
 requirement of a signature. Id. art. 6, variant A. While the Uniform Rules also provide that
 reliance on an enhanced electronic signature can only be determined by evaluating the
 context within which that reliance takes place, they also establish a duty on the part of the
 signature holder to prevent its misuse. Id. arts. 9, 10; see supra note 32 and accompanying text
 (discussing the pros and cons of technology specific electronic signature laws).
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 undertaking,231 the current rush to revise contract law through legislation
 may produce even more unfavorable results. A considerable body of opin-
 ion among lawyers and managers in the United States supports "media-
 neutral" approaches to the reform of contract law that minimizes the
 magnitude of substantive changes in the law. The constituencies that favor
 either "technology-specific" or "electronic commerce enabling" legislation
 that deliberately changes the substantive rules of contract in order to pro-
 mote a particular vision of electronic commerce are numerous and pow-
 erful, however, and it is unclear that the "media-neutral" approach will
 garner the political support it needs to counteract lobbying by specific
 industries to achieve more targeted revisions in contract law.
 The current struggles in the United States to define the legislative
 agenda for electronic contracting law reforms cannot be viewed in isolation
 from the actions of other governments in the same arenas. The EU econ-
 omy now represents a larger single market than the U.S. economy in terms
 of population, and while EU utilization rates for new electronic commerce
 technologies such as the Internet currently lags behind that of the United
 States, this may not be the case indefinitely. The EU currently seems to
 be just as divided as the Unites States in its efforts to define a coherent,
 feasible legislative agenda in this area, but almost any possible outcome of
 the current EU debates is likely to be more regulatory and more protective
 of consumers than almost any possible outcome of the current U.S. de-
 bates. As a result, the possibility of future trade disputes between the
 United States and EU over "non-tariff" barriers to electronic contracting
 may arise, just as conflicts now exist between the United States and EU
 over the EU' s higher standards for data privacy.
 Yet hasty legislation by national governments rushing to avoid losing a
 competitive advantage in the global electronic marketplace may not sup-
 port the development of electronic commerce at all. Poorly thought out
 legislation may instead create unnecessary inefficiencies in contracting
 practices if governments fail to correctly anticipate future developments
 in electronic commerce. Given the difficulty that entrepreneurs have in
 correctly anticipating future developments in this area, it seems almost
 inevitable that technology-specific or highly regulatory approaches by na-
 tional legislatures will not be successful in predicting the future, either. In
 the face of the torrent of innovation taking place in the commercial prac-
 231. The American Bar Association Section of Business Law's Cyberspace Law Com-
 mittee's Electronic Contracting Practices Working Group has a project currently underway
 to build a "clause bank" for electronic commerce contract terms. See ABA Cyberspace Law
 Committee (visited Oct. 8, 1999) <http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/cyber/ecommerce/
 ecommerce.html>. The working group plans to assemble and annotate electronic contracting
 clauses on its web site that could be used to update standard form contracts. See ABA Cy-
 berspace Law Committee's Contracting Practices Working Group, Electronic Contracting Prac-
 tices Resources Page (visited Oct. 8, 1999) <http://www.newlaw.com/site/e-contract.htm>.
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 tices through the application of new technologies and the limited resources
 available to national legislatures to understand and respond to that inno-
 vation, many clients may learn to prefer the "That's an interesting ques-
 tion" response from their attorneys when they learn what the alternatives
 are.
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